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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
ISSUE NO. 1. Did the court err by instructing the jury to determine if the Manager
of the Club Condominium, L.C. (the "Club") acted with gross negligence or willful
misconduct pursuant to a standard of a developer and/or contractor?
Standard of Review: Question of law reviewed for correctness. Laws v. Blanding
City. 893 P.2d 1083, 1984 (Utah Ct. App. 1995); Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. Co.. 918
P.2d 461, 466 (Utah 1996) (no deference).
Preservation of Issue: Record ("R.") 8591, p. 1387,1.16-25, pp.1498-1499.
ISSUE NO. 2. Did the court err in refusing to instruct the jury that only lost net
profits, not gross profits, are recoverable and only then if proven with reasonable certainty?
Standard of Review: Questions of law reviewed for correctness. Laws, 893 P.2d at
1984; Billings, 918 P.2d at 466 (no deference).
Preservation of Issue: R. 8591, p. 1387,1. 16-25, p. 1474,1. 11-17, p. 1499,1. 1-21.
ISSUE NO. 3. Did the court err in admitting (1) 3rd East's banking expert's bankingindustry-standard testimony without foundation of relevance or reliance thereon, and (2) 3rd
East's construction expert's construction-industry-standard testimony for arms-length
transactions, which contradicted the agreements authorized by the parties?
Standard of Review: Abuse-of-discretion. Kumho Tire Co. Ltd. v. Carmichael 119
S.Ct. 1167, 1170(1999).
SE \Liz\R Watts v StevenserAAppellate Brief v lOwpd

1

Preservation of Issue: R. 2769-2771; 2774-2776; 2782-2783; 4035-4037; 8484, p. 76,
1. 2-18; 8586, p. 538,1. 17-19, p. 539,1. 18-25, p. 540,1. 1-3.
ISSUE NO. 4. Was there an absence of substantial evidence for the jury to find that
any acts or omissions by the Manager of the The Club constituted gross negligence or willful
misconduct and if so, were such actions the proximate cause of any damage proven beyond
mere speculation to 3rd East?
Standard of Review: The Court of Appeals will reverse a jury verdict if, taking the
evidence in a light most favorable to the prevailing party, the appellant demonstrates that the
findings lack substantial evidentiary support. Jensen v. Sawyers. 2005, UT 81,1f 96, 130
P.3d 325; Water & Energy Sys. Tech.. Inc. v. Keil. 48 P.3d 888, 892 (Utah 2002);.
Preservation of Issue: R. 8064-65; 8198-8200; 8205-8223; 8395-8402; 8587 p. 732,
1. 12-16, p. 736,1. 15-18, p. 740,1. 11; 8592 p. 1540,1.5-20.
ISSUE NO. 5. Did the court err in granting 3rd East an award of prejudgment interest
when its damages were left to the best judgment of the jury?
Standard of Review: Question of law reviewed for correctness. Iron Head Constr.,
Inc. v. Gurnev. 2008 UT App 1.15.176 P.3d 453: Carlson Distrib. Co. v. Salt Lake Brewing
Co.. L.C. 2004 UT App 227, ^[15, 95 P.3d 1171; Cornia v. Wilcox. 898 P.2d 1379 (Utah
1995).
Preservation of Issue: R. 8299-8303:8316-8317:8321 -8326:8328:8421:8425:8427:
8583, pp. 50-54, p. 70,1. 6-18, p. 93,1. 24-25, p. 94,1. 1.
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ISSUE NO. 6.

Did the trial court err in awarding 3rd East attorney fees of

$226,400.00 against a total claim of $269,520.00 when 3rd East's attorney's affidavit failed
to adequately allocate attorney fees between its one successful claim for which attorney fees
were awarded and all other claims successful or unsuccessful?
Standard of Review: Abuse of discretion. Jensen, 2005 UT 81, 130 P.3d 325; Pack
v. Case. 2001 UT App 232, 30 P.3d 436.
Preservation of Issue: R. 8423-8425; 8521-8530; 8583, pp. 62-66, 70-73, 85-87, pp.
112-118, 123-124.
ISSUE NO. 7. Did the court err by awarding 3rd East expert witness fees, copy costs
and other costs that were not taxable or provided for by contract or law?
Standard of Review: Abuse of discretion. Armed Forces Ins. Exch. v. Harrison, 2003
UT 14, 70 P.3d 35; Young v. State. 2000 UT 91, 16 P.3d 549.
Preservation of Issue: R. 8317-8321; 8341-45; 8405-09; 8583, pp. 68-70, 73, 88-89.
RELEVANT STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. § 48-2b-l 19(2) (1996):
Records kept under this section are subject to inspection and copying at the
reasonable request and at the expense of any member during ordinary business
hours . . .
Utah Code Ann. § 48-2b-128 (1996):
From time to time, the limited liability company may distribute its property to
members of the limited liability company upon the basis stipulated in the
operating agreement if, after distribution is made, the fair value of the assets
of the limited liability company is in excess of all liabilities of the limited
liability except liabilities to members on account of their contributions.
SE \Liz\R Watts v Stevensen\Appellate Brief v lOwpd
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case: Stevensen 3rd East, L.C. ("3rd East"), a member of The Club
Condominium, L.C. ("The Club"), the business of which was the construction and sale of
The Club Condominiums project (the "Project") in downtown Salt Lake City, asserted a
breach of fiduciary duty claim against The Club's manager, Russell Watts ("Watts"). The
jury entered a verdict in favor of 3rd East against The Club for $26,240 (breach of covenant
of good faith and fair dealing) and against Watts for $474,000 (breach of fiduciary duty)
(Verdict at Addendum ("A").C-5) and denied 3rd East's punitive damages claim. (Verdict
Punitive Damages at A.C-6). The court awarded 3rd East attorneys fees of $226,400,
prejudgment interest of $199,317, expert witness fees of $36,710, copy costs of $8,400, and
other costs. (Final Judgment, at A.C-9). Watts seeks to overturn the Verdict and reverse other
rulings of the court.
Course of Proceedings: 3rd East filed this action on May 9, 2001. R. 1-36. See also
Am. Comp. R626-666 (A.C-1). Through several pre-trial motions, many of 3rd East's and
all its members' claims were dismissed. 3rd East's surviving claims were tried in an eight-day
jury trial in the Third District Court (01/22/07-02/01/07). Watts moved for a Directed
Verdict on all issues, which the court denied. R. 8587, pp. 732-771; 8591, p. 1496,1. 13-18.
The jury rendered its Verdict on February 1,2007 (A.C-5,6). Watts filed a JNOV Motion on
February 15, 2007. R. 8198-8226. The trial court denied the Motion and entered its Final
Judgment on September 4, 2007. R. 8544-8548. Watts filed a Notice of Appeal on
September 19, 2007. R. 8564-8566 (A.C-10).
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Stevensen and Watts determined to build a 45-48 unit residential condominium project
(Ex. 346) on land owned by Stevensen. The parties formed The Club by signing an
Operating Agreement (A.D-1), with R.K.W. 96, L.C. ("RKW") and 3rd East each owning
50%. Watts was named Manager. 3rd East contributed land valued at $631,000 (R. 40224023), and RKW contributed $180,000 and a Development Fee (the "Fee") booked at
$451,000. R. 8590, p. 1362,1.2-3. The Operating Agreement authorized Watts Corporation
("Watts Corp"), an affiliate of Watts, to act as general contractor and Kevin Watts Architects
(the "Architect"), also an affiliate of Watts, to act as architect. On June 15,1997, The Club,
by the signature of Mr. Stevensen, fee of 8% of total construction costs and interest of 12%
per annum on unpaid draws, with substantial completion to occur 15 months after
commencement, subject to forces majeure (Ex. 10). The Operating Agreement (§4.1) also
provided that changes to the budget were to be agreed to in writing by RKW and 3rd East.
The Club obtained a construction loan (the "Bank Loan" (Ex. 18)) for less than
needed to construct the Project. R. 8586, pp. 398-399. The plan was to use proceeds of early
sales to complete remaining units and to borrow additional funds from less-expensive private
lenders, as needed. R. 8586, pp. 480-481. Watts Corp, Stevensen, and Watts jointly borrowed
additional funds from private lenders. Ex. 564 (A.D-8), 566, 567 and 568 (A.D-9).
The Club obtained its building permit on August 11, 1997. R. 8590, p. 1311,1. 5-6.
The model unit was completed in November, 1998, the remaining units were only to be
finished to sheetrock stage so buyers could choose finishes and money would be saved on
SE \Liz\R Watts v StevenserAAppellate Brief v lOwpd
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loan interest. R. 8585, p. 257, 1. 17-22; 8586, p. 409, 1. 1-4; 8590, pp. 1316-1317. On or
about October 21, 1997, Watts and Stevensen agreed to a new proforma for construction
(" 10/21/97 Proforma") which estimated hard costs of $6.7 million (more than the Bank Loan)
and net profits of $785,601.00. Ex 22 (A.D-5). Additional financial information (including
a 10/30/98 Proforma and a February 11,1999, Financial Review was provided from time to
time, adjusting cost projections as they became clearer (A.D-5, 6). Ex. 23, 50. As the lobby
and common areas neared completion, Watts Corp began funding part of the construction
costs. R. 8585, p. 299,1. 20-23; Exs. 51, 33.
Because of their inability to make sales, the Stevensens and their son were removed
from marketing pursuant to a March 25, 1999 memorandum (the "March Agreement"),
which delineated (1) 3rd East's agreement to cease marketing; (2) commissions to be paid
(Watts Group 3% and 3rd East 1%); (3) priority of debt repayments; and (4) the reduction of
the interest rate payable to Watts Corp to 9%. Ex. 7 (A.D-14).
In September 1999, with more than half of the units unsold, Watts provided Stevensen
the 9/5/99 Proforma. Ex. 24 (A.D-5) & 762 (A.D-11 at Ex. 8); R. 8587, p. 629,1. 5-15.
Projected costs increased and net profits decreased. At this time, The Club had already
advanced $162,000 to 3rd East. A.D-11.
Subsequent to a meeting regarding the 9/5/99 Proforma, Stevensen was no longer
involved with the Project despite repeated contacts from Watts. Watts terminated the $5,000
monthly advances against to 3rd East testifying that his decision to do so was "[b]ased on
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there being no profit in the project..."1 R. 8585, pp. 315-316; 8587, p. 631,1. 16-18. Watts
also discontinued 3rd East's 1% payments under the March Agreement. Ex. 599 (A.D-10).
The Club didn't sell its last unit until November 3, 2002 (A.D-11 at Ex. 8). Watts
testified that the slow market caused an increase of $2,050,000.00 in four primary cost
categories beyond his control: (a) hard construction costs ($800,000 increase for finish
improvements dictated by buyers to obtain sales); (b) interest costs ($905,000 increase due
to the slow, extended sales period); (c) marketing costs ($222,000 increase due to the slow,
difficult sales period); and (d) actual utility costs ($39,000 increase due to maintaining units
over extended sales period). Exs. 22,708,797,798; R. 8590, pp. 1269-1270, pp. 1383-1384.
RKW lost $159,562.00 in cash and was never paid its Fee. RKW's investment loss was
$609,782 (Ex. 793). 3rd East contributed land valued at $631,000.00, and after receipt of its
profit advances ($162,000.00) its investment loss was $469,000 (Ex. 793). According to the
stipulated accounting of The Club, including credit for unpaid 1% commissions
($53,242.00),2 3rd East was over-disbursed $26,241.00 and RKW was owed $26,241.00.
A.D-11 at Ex. 1.
SUMMARY
The jury verdict in favor of 3rd East, as a member of The Club, and against Watts, as
manager, for lost profits arising out of the development and sale of a residential
1

3rd East's counsel affirmed that the discontinued monthly draw was not part of
3rd East's claim against Watts. R. 8587, p. 686,1. 1-9, p. 738,1. 19-25.
2

1% commissions included in the stipulated accounting (Order reciting 3rd East's
withdrawal of claim for accounting. R. 6866-75 at R. 6973). See also A.D-11.
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condominium project during a slow sales period was the result of erroneous jury instructions,
irrelevant and prejudicial expert testimony, and a lack of substantial evidence proving
liability, proximate cause, or damages. As a result of the faulty verdict, the court erroneously
awarded prejudgment interest, attorney and expert witness fees, and other costs.
The verdict was the result of the court's instruction to apply a professional
builder/developer standard to measure Watts' conduct as manager rather than one of an
ordinary prudent person. Such a heightened standard is not justified by the law of LLC's or
its guiding corporate principles.
The jury was also erroneously instructed that they could use any formula reasonable
to them to determine damages rather than being instructed to complete a net profits analysis.
The court abused its discretion by admitting irrelevant, prejudicial, and unreliable
expert testimony regarding industry standards in banking and construction. The banking
standards, never relied upon by 3rd East, only confused the issues as there was no damage
from any such claimed breach. The construction expert's standards testimony disregarded
the parties' agreements to permit Watts to engage in self-dealing and was based on inaccurate
facts and faulty logic.
No substantial evidence was provided to establish gross negligence, willful
misconduct, or proximate cause. In fact, intervening causes beyond the Manager's control
were admitted by 3rd East's own expert. Finally, damages were also speculative. No
unnecessary costs or lost sales were established.
Any award was left to the best judgment of the jury. Nevertheless, the court
SE \Liz\R Watts v Stevensen\Appellate Brief v lOwpd
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disregarded Utah's established standards to award prejudgment interest and awarded it
anyway.
As additional error, the court awarded attorney fees despite deficient affidavits that
did not allocate time between parties and claims.
Finally, the court erroneously awarded expert witness fees and other costs in violation
of the Rules of Civil Procedure and Utah law regarding consequential damages.
ARGUMENT
ISSUE NO. 1. Did the court err by instructing the jury to determine if the Manager of the
Club Condominium, L.C. (the "Club") acted with gross negligence or willful misconduct
pursuant to a standard of a developer and/or contractor?
1.1

The Trial Court Committed Error by Imposing a Builder/Developer Standard

on Watts as the Manager of The Club. This Court should find that the trial court imposed
an incorrect, heightened standard of care on Watts as manager of a limited liability company
("LLC"). The propriety of jury instructions is a question of law which is reviewed for
correctness without deference to the trial court. Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. Co.. 918 P.2d
461, 466 (Utah 1996); Laws v. Blanding City. 893 P.2d 1083, 1984 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).
The trial court correctly determined that the standard of liability of a manager of an
LLC is the gross-negligence and willful-misconduct standard of corporate law. R. 71337138 (A.C-3).3

See also Annotation, Construction and Application of Limited Liability

Company Acts, 79 A.L.R. 5th 689, 698 (where characteristics originated from corporate law,
corporate principles are used to resolve the issues). Kaycee Land and Livestock v. Flahive.
3

Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-807 (2001) has since adopted this standard.
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46 P.3d 323, 326-329 (Wyo. 2002); Hollowell v. Orleans Reg'l Hosp.. LLC. 217 F.3d 379,
385 (5th Cir. 2000). The court, however, incorrectly instructed the jury that Watts must
exercise the skill and learning of a builder and developer according to industry standards.
Jury Inst. 51, R. 8172 (A.C-4). The court should have consistently applied Utah corporate
principles which do not impose on officers and directors a standard of & professional* While
a manager's skill and learning may be considered, the erroneous instruction created a new
standard of care. The heightened standard increased the liability of an LLC manager beyond
the law.
1.2

The Court's Erroneous Instruction Likely Affected the Verdict. There is a

reasonable likelihood that the erroneous instruction affected the Verdict. See Haupt v.
Heaps, 2005 UT App 436, | 38, 131 P.3d 252. Watts was acting as the Manager, not the
developer (that was RKW) or the contractor (that was Watts Corp) (Ex. 4 at §§ 4.1, 10.1).
The court permitted testimony of construction industry standards. See Issue No. 3 below.
This testimony, together with the erroneous instruction, created confusion as 3rd East
continually asserted the deficiencies of the contractor and the developer. 3rd East did not sue
the contractor. See (A.C-1). 3rd East made claims against RKW in its capacity as a member
of The Club not as the developer and did not even submit those claims to the jury. R. 81888195. None of these claims were submitted to the jury. See id. R. 8188-8195. The claims
submitted to the jury related to Watts as Manager of The Club. R. 8194.
4

Officers/directors are to discharge duties "with the care an ordinary prudent
person in a like position would exercise under similar circumstances." Utah Code Ann.
§16-10a-840(l).
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The combination of the erroneous instruction, and the irrelevant, prejudicial
testimony of industry standards permitted the jury to consider this case as though it were one
against a builder/developer for negligent construction rather than a case against a manager
of an LLC for mismanagement likely resulting in an erroneous Verdict.
ISSUE NO. 2. Did the court err in refusing to instruct the jury that only lost net profits, not
gross profits, are recoverable and then only if proven with reasonable certainty?
2,1

The Trial Court Failed to Properly Instruct the Jury on Net Profits Damages.

The propriety of jury instructions presents a question of law which is reviewed for
correctness without deference to the court. Billings, 918 P.2d at 466; Laws, 893 P.2d at
1984. 3rd East claimed that Watts' acts diminished "the profit and return of capital to 3rd
East." R. 643-644 (A.C-1). The court did not properly instruct the jury that a claim for lost
profits requires reasonable certainty of lost net profits (not gross profits as only net profits
may be recovered). Carlson Distrib. Co. v. Salt Lake Brewing Co., L.C., 2004 UT App 227,
fl8, 95 P.3d 1171; Sawyers v. FMA Leasing Co., 722 P.2d 773, 774 (Utah 1986). Net
profits must be proven with "supporting evidence of overhead expenses, or other costs of
producing income from which a net figure can be derived.55 Carlson, 2004 UT App 227, ^[18;
Sawyers, 722 P.2d at 774. At a minimum, opinions or estimates of lost profit must be based
on objective facts, figures or data from which the amount of lost profit may be ascertained.
Szczepanik v. First S. Trust Co., 883 S.W. 2d 648, 649 (TX 1994). "Proof of loss of gross
income only is an insufficient foundation for proof of amount of damages." Sawyers, 722
P.2d at 774; Atkin. Wright & Miles v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel., 709 P.2d 330, 336 (Utah
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1985). Moreover, testimony of expectation is insufficient as it is purely speculation.
Szczepanik. 883 S.W. 2d at 649.
The court permitted the jury to use any formula or theory for determining damages
which is based upon the evidence of the case and which you believe to be reasonable. See
Jury Inst. 53; R. 8174; (A.C-4). Before 3rd East was awarded any lost profits, the amount of
net profits the Project would have made but for Watts' actions should have first been
objectively determined. The court's damages instruction did not properly direct the jury to
undertake the required analysis and was, therefore, in error.
2.2.

The Erroneous Instruction Resulted in a Damage Award in Violation of Utah

Law and Based on Speculation. There is a reasonable likelihood that the erroneous
instruction affected the damage award (Haupt) as Utah case law illuminates. See Canyon
Country Store v. Bracev, 781 P.2d 414, 418-19 (Utah 1989) (reversing jury award of lost
profits based solely on speculation, e.g., allegations of lost customers but no proof);
Sawyers, 722 P.2d at 774 (lack of evidence of overhead and other expenses to permit
reasonable calculation of net profits is fatal to claim for lost profits); Carlson, 2004 UT App
227,1flfl7, 20 (upholding directed verdict, as there was no evidence of gross profits or costs
to determine net profits); Szczepanick, 883 S.W.2d at 649-650 (instructed verdict should
have been granted as lost profits based proof upon expectation is speculation); HoltAtherton
Indus. Jnc. v. Heine, 835 S.W. 2d 80,85 (Tex. 1992) (reversing award of lost profits for lack
of proof of lost contracts).
3rd East's damage evidence was nothing but an expectation of buyers and profits. To
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support a claim that lower-priced units should have been built, 3rd East presented no proof
of income or expenses that would have been incurred (or avoided). There is a complete lack
of evidence of (a) any available buyers or specific sales that were lost, or (b) of other similar
projects at that time that made any profit or experienced less of a loss. 3rd East's accounting
expert ("Teuscher") simply used the actual sales proceeds (as set forth in the stipulated
accounting (A.D-11)) achieved during the 3-year sales period for the Project as constructed
(including upgrades) and disregarded all increased costs other than commissions. Ex. 97
(A.D-7). Teuscher did not provide any objective facts, figures or data to determine what
costs were necessary or not, or what revenues could have been other than those obtained. R.
8587, p. 589,1. 15-25, p. 590,1. 1-24. 3rd East's construction expert could not identify any
unnecessary costs, potential sale prices, or availability of buyers. R. 8585, p. 159,1. 8-25,
p. 160,1. 1-22, p. 161,1. 5-12. Where such evidence is lacking, this Court and others have
found that jury verdicts should be overturned, damage awards reversed, and directed verdicts
of dismissal upheld. See Issue 4, Lack of Evidence of Damages. Because of the erroneous
instruction and failure of proof, the Verdict must be overturned.
ISSUE NO. 3. Did the court err in admitting (1) 3rd East's banking expert's bankingindustry-standard testimony without foundation of relevance or reliance thereon, and (2) 3rd
East's construction expert's construction-industry-standard testimony for arms-length
transactions, which contradicted the agreements authorized by the parties?
A trial court has a "gatekeeping function" to determine whether testimony rests on a
reliable foundation, is relevant, or unfairly prejudicial prior to admitting it. Goebel v. Denver
& Rio Grande W. R.R. Co., 215 F. 3d 1083, 1087 (10th Cir. 2000). "Evidence which is not
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relevant is not admissible." Utah R. Evid. 402. The court should not admit evidence the
probative value of which is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury. Utah R. Evid. 403. Error is reversible "only
if, absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood that there would have been a more
favorable result." Carlson, 2004 UT App 227, If 26; Olympus Hills Shopping Ctr, Ltd. v.
Smith's Food & Drug Cntrs, Inc., 889 P.2d 445, 455 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).
3.1.

Banking Industry Testimony. The lower court permitted Kesler to testify regarding

industry standards in construction lending, notwithstanding Appellant's objection. The court
reserved final ruling on Appellant's Motion in Limine until trial. R. 4036-4037. At trial, the
court permitted Kesler's testimony explaining:
it seems to me that //the standards of the industry are somehow implicated and
//there were testimony indicating that a party then relied upon the standards
of the industry and they weren't followed or something like that, it could be
relevant. We don yt have that testimony because Mr. Stevensen hasn yt testified
yet, so my feeling was that it could be relevant at some point but we don't
know at this point.
R. 8586, p. 539,1. 21-25, p. 540,1. 1-3 (emphasis added).
Kesler opined that a lender's biggest risk is a project running out of money before it
is completed, lenders protect themselves by placing restrictions on changes to keep loans in
balance, and banks generally require borrowers to use their own funds when their loans get
out-of-balance. R. 8586, pp. 536-538. Kesler opined that Watts did not comport with the
industry standards (R. 8992); namely, Watts had (a) made changes to the plans without
always timely informing the bank as required by the loan documents, and (b) permitted the
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loan to get out-of-balance because of said changes (R. 8993, 8996).
Kesler's testimony is not reliable. He admitted that he did not review any internal
bank records, so he did not know what the bank knew or when it knew it. R. 8996-8997. He
could only speculate. Thurston v. Workers Comp. Fund of Utah, 2003 UT App 438, Tf 20,
83P.3d391 (experts are not permitted to speculate). Kesler admitted he did not know if The
Club contributed its own funds when the loan got out-of-balance. R. 8993. Watts' deposition
testimony read into the record during Kesler's testimony confirms that The Club was doing
upgrades at its own expense. R. 8995. See also A.D-11.
Kesler's testimony is not relevant. Parties are free to establish their own course of
dealing and are not required to follow industry standards. Such is the case here. Furthermore,
at no time did 3rd East allege in its Opposition to Watts' Motion in Limine or in testimony,
that it relied upon industry standards in banking. Absent some alleged reliance on banking
industry standards, the testimony is irrelevant. The bank is the proper party to complain of
any nonconformance with banking industry standards. However, Kesler admitted (to the
court's surprise) that the bank never declared the loan in default and never foreclosed. R.
8993-8994, 8997.
Kesler's testimony was nothing but a prejudicial red herring as to Watts' alleged gross
negligence or willful misconduct. It was more prejudicial and misleading than probative of
any fact of consequence and confused the jury. The court abused its discretion by admitting
it. Watts should be granted a new trial.
3.2

Construction Industry Testimony. The court permitted 3 rd East's construction
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expert ("Larsen") to testify regarding construction industry standards over Watts' objection.
The court ruled:
I'm going to let him testify and if he wants to testify about industry standards
you can rip him apart on cross examination and show those standards are not
consistent with the agreements, for example, or whatever else you would like
to show.
R. 8584, p. 76,1.2-18.
Larsen's testimony was irrelevant, unreliable, and prejudicial. First, Larsen testified
that the Construction Contract was not one that you would ever enter into with a stranger
because it was a cost-plus contract without a guaranteed maximum price and some
jurisdictions don't allow those. R. 8584, pp. 89-90. This testimony was irrelevant because
3rd East's claims were not based upon the terms of the contract. R. 8583, pp. 26-27
(admission by 3rd East's counsel). The testimony served only to prejudice and mislead.
Larsen also testified that the liability limits of the Architect's Contract were less than
would be expected in an industry arms-length contract. R. 8585, pp. 119-120. See Ex. 11
(A.D-3). However, the terms of the contract were agreed to by The Club and no claims were
ever made against the Architect. See A.C-1. This testimony was therefore not relevant and
served only to prejudice and mislead.
Larsen testified that The Club's contracts with the contractor and Architect were to
be enforced as arms-length contracts with third parties. R. 8584, pp. 141-142. This is not
true, however, since the Operating Agreement establishes an arms-length standard only in
one instance: the payment to Watts Corp and the Architect (to be based on their customary,
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arms-length fees) (Ex. 10, §4.1 (A.D-2)). Nevertheless, Larsen was permitted to opine that
the Construction Contract was not enforced as an arms-length transaction. He testified that
in an arms-length transaction you would find letters from the owner to the contractor
enforcing deadlines. In this case, however, Watts would be writing such letters to himself.
R.8584, p. 113, 1. 3-15. How would this have helped the project? 3rd East's counsel
acknowledged that Watts was the representative for the contractor and The Club and in both
capacities knew what was going on. R. 8588, pp. 943-944. This testimony only served to
prejudice and mislead.
Larsen particularly criticized the Architect's failure to review draw requests and
presumed this failure permitted the contractor to make changes without knowledge of the
owner, increasing costs and extending performance. R. 8585, pp. 122-128. However, in this
case, the owner's representative was the contractor's representative. Therefore, the owner
did have knowledge of the changes. This testimony is not relevant to the structure of the
transaction and served only to prejudice, mislead, and confuse.
Finally, Larsen testified that he did not think that Watts Corp should have charged
itself interest. R. 8585, p. 186,1. 12-25. This testimony was an irrelevant incongruity vis-avis the Construction Contract, which provided for the payment of interest at 12% for late
payments, later reduced to 9%. (A.D-14, 2 §14.1).
Larsen was 3rd East's primary witness, yet he disregarded the very nature of the
members' agreement to use affiliated entities and based his opinions on erroneous premises.
Admission of his testimony was an abuse of discretion. (Contrary to the court's rationale,
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cross examination was insufficient because the damage had already been done.) The jury
was lead to believe that the contracts were improper and that Watts' actions should have
conformed with an arms-length transaction. That is misleading, confusing and prejudicial.
Watts should be granted a new trial.
ISSUE NO. 4. Was there an absence of substantial evidence for the jury to find that any acts
or omissions by the Manager of The Club constituted gross negligence or willful misconduct
and if so, were such actions the proximate cause of any damage proven beyond mere
speculation to 3rd East?
4.1.

Watts1 Obligation to Marshal the Evidence. To meet his burden of proving a lack

of substantial evidence to overturn the Verdict, Watts must marshal all of the evidence that
might possibly support the Verdict and then expose the fatal flaw. Interiors Contracting, Inc.
v. Smith Halander & Smith Assocs.. 881 P.2d 929,933 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).5 The evidence
is as follows:
Stevensen testified that he did not have construction experience prior to the deal. R.
8587, p. 613,1.4-11, p. 618,1. 10-11. He didn't know what the costs were (Id. at p. 664) and
received documents infrequently from Watts. Id. at p. 634. He testified that he never saw
the plans (Ex. 792). Id. at p. 673. He testified that he never had any discussions with Watts
about the costs of items, and that Watts never came to him for any approvals or
recommendations. Ld. at pp. 641-642.
5

In the event the Court entertains the possibility that Watts has not met his burden
to marshal despite his extensive efforts, Watts implores this Court to exercise its
discretion to review the record to determine if the decision below had adequate factual
support. See Martinez v. Media Payments Plus/Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day
Saints, 2007 UT 42,fflf17-19, 164 P.3d 384. This unjust Verdict must not be permitted to
stand.
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Stevensen testified that he was told they were going to get the Project done as fast as
they could because time was money. Id. at p. 614. He was told to expect a projected profit
of $800,000 from the Project. Id. at p. 617. He and Watts did not have discussions regarding
that expectation frequently, but he was periodically given memos suggesting the profit would
be $800,000. Id. at p. 618. He noticed in the memos that some of the information was
changing. Id. He testified he was dealing with a professional, the manager, his partner, and
he trusted him. Id. Stevensen also testified that he couldn't recall Mr. Watts telling him
about risks to profit other than costs. Id. at p. 619.
3rd East stipulated that Watts had the background and experience with which to make
projections, formulate budgets, and anticipate issues with respect to the Project. R. 8590, p.
1183,1. 18-23. When they decided on the type of project to develop, Watts gave Stevensen
a Proforma (the 1/2/97 Proforma showing $800,000 in projected profits. Ex. 20 ([TS00005,
3).6 The Club ended up being nicer than originally conceived. R. 8586, pp. 370-371. On
February 20,1997, Stevensen initialed a Club Bank Budget (Ex. 360) although he didn't read
it. R. 8587, pp. 705-706.
An appraisal was prepared as a part of the efforts to obtain financing (the
"Appraisal"). Ex. 16 (A.D-4). The Appraisal gave a non-market value to the Project of
$8,160,000.7 (Ex. 16 at p. 2 of cover letter). The Appraisal referred to absorption rates (the
6

Stevensen's counsel stipulated that Stevensen produced all documents with a
Bates stamp commencing with "TS" and that he had received them. R.8587, p. 635.
7

The Free Appraisal defined "Market Value" as "the most probable price which a
property should bring in a competitive and open market under all conditions requisite to a
1Q

SE \Liz\R Watts v StevenserAAppellate Brief v lOwpd

A

•*

time it takes for buyers in the market to purchase units constructed and offered for sale) and
advised that absorption of higher priced units may be problematic. R. 8994; A.D-4 at pp. 6465. Watts saw the Appraisal. R. 8585, p. 225, 1. 16-17. The Club hired the Architect in
April, 1997 (A.D-3). Larsen testified that the Architect's Contract differed from a true armslength relationship as the liability limits were lower than usual. R. 8585, p. 119,1. 22-25, p.
120,1. 1-17. On May 23, 1997, The Club received a financing proposal from The Bank that
referred to the Appraisal. Ex. 15.
On June 15, 1997, The Club, by the signature of Stevensen, hired Watts Corp as the
general contractor, using a cost plus percentage fee contract which included provisions for
interest (12% per annum) on late payments. A.D-1, 2; R. 8586. 3 rd East's construction
expert ("Larsen") testified that the Construction Contract was not the type of contract that
you would enter into with a stranger.8 R. 8584, p. 89. Larsen testified that changes increased
payment to Watts Corp by virtue of the terms of the Construction Contract. R. 8585, p. 151,
1. 9-11. Watts testified that the fee to Watts Corp increased as costs went up. R. 8586, p.
365,1. 21-24. Larsen criticized Watts because certain documents were not in existence and
not attached to the Construction Contract, namely a Homeowner Selection List and a
Construction Budget dated June 25,1997(A.D-2V R. 8584, p. 419,1. 14-16;. 8587, pp. 701702; R. 8590, pp. 1215-1216.

fair sale." Ex. 16 at p. 3.
8

3rd East's counsel affirmed that the cost/plus contract was not the basis for their
claim-it was not an issue, the parties agreed to it, and the contract by itself was not a
breach of fiduciary duty. R. 8583, pp. 26-27.
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The Architect completed the plans (Ex. 792) on or about June 20, 1997. R. 8584, pp.
936-937. On July 11, 1997, The Club got a Bank Loan (Ex. 18) based upon the bulk rate
value of the Project established by the Appraisal, not the retail value. R. 8585, p. 250,1.2324. 3rd East's banking expert (Kesler) testified of banking industry standards and that Watts'
conduct did not comport with the banking industry standards. See Issue 3.1 above.
Hard Costs in the Bank Loan budget were $5,102,000 and the maturity date of the
Bank Loan was March 11, 1999 (Ex. 18). Kesler opined that Watts intentionally borrowed
less than needed to construct the Project based upon the proformas. R. 8996. Watts'
deposition testimony stated that Paul Thurston (a banker for the Bank) knew that they were
borrowing less than they needed, but the bank people didn't. R. 8998. Kesler opined that
Watts seemed to distinguish between the Bank and Paul Thurston. R. 8998.
Watts knew there was a risk of running out of money before the Project was
completed. R. 8586, p. 399,1. 4-8. Stevensen said that he did not expect the construction
project to run out of money before it was entirely built. R. 8587, p. 618. Stevensen said he
did not expect the Bank Loan to become due prior to completion of the Project. Id.
Watts Corp generated a construction schedule with a start date of August 11,1997 and
completion in 11 mos (Ex. 41). The Club obtained its building permit on August 11,1997.
R. 8590, p. 1311. The Construction Contract called for Substantial Completion with 15
months after the date of commencement. A.D-2. Watts Corp commenced construction
within ten days after obtaining the building permit. Id. Larsen stated that he did not see any
effort on the part of Watts Corp to push subcontractors to perform within the schedule or
SE \L»z\R Watts v StevenserAAppellate Brief v lOwpd

21

evidence of Daily Reports. R. 8584, p. 94,1. 1-5, p. 112,1. 14-25. Larsen said some of the
subcontractor contracts were cost plus contracts, therefore, Watts was unable to determine
what his ultimate costs might have been. Id. at pp. 105-106.
Between July and October 1997 there were some redesigns. R. 8585, p. 252,1. 1-5.
On or about October 21, 1997, the members agreed to the 10/21/97 Proforma which
projected hard construction costs of $6.7 million (an amount more than the Bank Loan) and
projected profits of $785,601.9 Despite not recalling the document, Stevensen testified that
Watts represented he would build the building for that amount. R. 8587, p. 697,1. 22-23.
Larsen testified that there is an industry standard that changes are not made to plans
after they are finalized because changes always have costs associated with them and they
cause delay, and delay causes increased interest. R. 8584, pp. 101-104. Larsen opined that
Watts Corp made numerous changes to the Project after the plans were completed and in the
first year (before sales slowed). He said the changes delayed construction by more than a
year and that alone increased interest including the interest paid to Watts Corp. Id. at p. 104.
Larsen opined that the delay caused by the changes caused damage because the faster you
finish, the more money you make, because the shorter your loan is from the bank because
interest typically decreases once construction is finished. R. 8584, p. 112,1. 8-11.
Larsen identified one change: a change to the mechanical system. R. 8584, pp. 96-97.

9

Exs. 18, 22 (A.D-5); R. 8585, pp. 239-240, p. 251,1. 20-22; R. 8587, pp. 696697; R. 8590, p. 1208,1. 4-6, p. 1287,1. 5-7, p.1382,1. 2-3, 19-22. (Watts testifying:
"Yes, Ted and I signed this budget agreeing that we would move forward based on this
projection as partners of The Club, LC").
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He doubted the change was intended to save The Club money since Watts Corp went back
to the contractor for a new bid. Larsen testified that going back to the same contractor rarely
results in a better price because they already have the contract. R. 8585, pp. 155-156. Larsen
stated that other changes were discussed in the weekly meetings. R. 8584, pp. 101-104.
Larsen opined that Watts made the changes to make a monument to further his reputation
based upon Watts' deposition testimony that they tried to build the best project for the
marketplace and that he hoped he had a good reputation. R. 8584, p. 92; R. 8585, p. 150.
Larsen5 s opinion was that Watts should have been conscious of the costs of upgrades versus
the value he could obtain for them. R. 8585, p. 152,1.15-22. He said Watt's changes made
the Project more expensive and he was not sure they increased proportionately to the selling
price. He did not see any evidence that there was an investigation they would reap the added
value of the changes in sales. R. 8585, p. 151,1.12-14, p. 206,1. 5-15; 8584,p.l08,l. 18-25.
No less than nine changes were made to the Project.10 Changes to the lobby may have
increased costs by $25,000.00 to $40,000.00. R. 8586, p. 376,1. 1-8. Larsen opined that the
changes suggested that Watts did not control the changes to the detriment of the Project,
reflecting a lack of exercise of skill in managing the Project. R. 8585, pp. 197-198. Larsen
testified that he did not know if Stevensen was involved in the changes, but if he was, he was
likely not aware of the impact. R. 8585, pp. 152-153. Stevensen testified that he had nothing

10

(1) facade (R. 8586, p. 375); (2) lobby (R. 8588, p. 981); (3) pilasters (Id.); (4)
roof (Id. at p. 922); (5) unit layout (Id. at p. 926); (6) toilet placement (Id. at pp. 923-924);
(7) unit finishes (Id. at p. 928); (8) trash chute (R. 8587, p. 643); and (9) courtyard (Id. at
p. 675).
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to do with the lobby. R. 8587, at p. 675. When questioned as to the impact of the changes
on costs Larsen said: "All I have is the end result of the changes. There was an increase and
extend[sic] duration of performance which Mr. Watts said in his deposition resulted from his
changes." R. 8585, p. 153,1. 25, p. 154,1. 1-4. For that opinion, Larsen relied on Watts'
deposition testimony answering the question "Why did it take longer than your original
projected 14 months or so? A. Just level of finish - level of finish.11 R. 8590, p. 1319,1. 422. With respect to the decision to complete units as buyers were found, Larsen opined that
the parties could have completed the entire construction and ended their obligations to the
Bank by converting to a new loan. R. 8585, pp. 161-62.
Larsen testified that Watts, as the manager of The Club, did not require the Architect
to monitor and interact with the contractor as in a typical arms-length relationship. R. 8584,
p. 184. He found no evidence of periodic visits by the Architect or his representative as
required by Sections 2.6.5 and 2.6.11 of the Architect's Contract. A.D-3; R. 8584, p. 93, p.
97, 1. 2-7; R. 8585, pp. 121-122, pp. 124-125. He reasoned that since the Architect
conducted no site visits, there were no reports of faulty construction for which the contractor
should not have been paid. R. 8584, pp. 93-94. He testified that the Architect's Contract was
not carried out in a typical arms-length manner (e.g., § 2.6.10 calling for the Architect to
review payment applications was not performed (R. 8585, pp. 122-123), and § 2.6.14 no
issuance of final certificate of payment (R. 8585, p. 126)). Dazely did not review draw
requests. R. 8588, pp. 944-945. Larsen testified that he did not see any evidence of the
Architect trying to realize cost savings on the Project. R. 8584, p. 109, 1. 6-11. (Watts
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admitted the architect was not involved in the budget, he was only to ensure that the Project
was built to plans and codes. $. 8586, p. 416,1. 14-15, 491-94)
Larsen testified that did not see evidence that the Architect reviewed any shop
drawings. R. 8585, p. 125,1. 6-9. He opined that The Club lost the benefits of a third-party
architect resulting in delays, unreviewed changes, and lost money. R. 8585, pp. 127-128.
He testified that in true arms-length transactions the owner would find out in a month on his
own or through the architect that the contractor was engaged in redesigns and causing delay.
R. 8584, p. 114.
On August 4,1998, Watts Corp generated a memo scheduling the Grand Opening for
October 17, 1998 (Ex. 76). Larsen testified that they reasonably could have been finished
by October 17th if "they" would have stopped the redesigns. R. 8585, pp. 195-196. Watts
Corp generated subsequent memos scheduling the Grand Opening date for mid-November,
1998, then January, 1999 (Exs. 46, 47). The Grand Opening was delayed by (1) items such
as landscape and patios and furniture for the model, and (2) by the holidays as Watts and the
Watts Group thought that was an unfavorable market time. R. 8585, p. 295,1.3-15; R. 8588,
p. 900,1. 12-17.
In his October 26, 1998 report, the Bank's architect, who regularly inspected the
Project, stated that the Project's completion was under the estimated completion by
approximately 7% and recommended that the funding of the payment application be held
until the bank was satisfied that all conditions of the agreements had been met (Ex. 685 at
Bates nos. 200372-200376). At that time, Stevensen was given the 10/30/98 Proforma that
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set out hard construction costs of $6.9 million (an increase from the 10/21/97 Proforma and
more than the Bank Loan) and projected net profit of $820,500/ Exs. 22, 23 (A.D-5). R.
8585, p. 255,1. 13-18; R.8587, pp. 634-635. By October 30, 1998, none of the units had
been placed under contract or closed (A.D-11 at Ex. 8). By October 1998, Watts knew the
Project was going to be running short of money from the Bank Loan before they had their
first unit sold. R. 8586, p. 390,1. 3-16. Kesler testified that the October budget was $1.7
million higher - a 20% increase. He said the loan by definition was not in balance and the
borrower would have to contribute funds to keep it in balance (he didn't know if that was
done). R. 8993, 8997. Watts' deposition was read explaining that he told the bank that they
were doing additional, ongoing upgrades at their own expense. R. 8995 (1. 25, 1-2). The
Bank may have learned about changes after the date of the changes in the proformas. R.
8995-96. Watts Corp funded part of the construction costs over the Bank Loan and charged
interest on those funds. R. 8585, p. 299,1.20-23; Ex. 51; R. 8995 (1.25,1-2). Kesler opined
that not providing proformas to the bank as changes were being made was not being
forthright. R. 8998. Kesler opined that as costs increased, the projected sales prices
increased, but the percentage of return went down. R. 8994. Watts agreed that the profit
didn't really improve as costs went up. R. 8586, pp. 371-372. To Kesler, that showed more
risk of getting a return because of a lower rate of return. R. 8994. Larsen also testified that
as changes were made, costs increased, but the projected profit stayed the same and so he
"believed" the profit projections were backed into. R. 8585, p. 166,1. 13-20.
The Project was not substantially complete by October or November, 1998 which
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Larsen attributed to the changes. R. 8584, p. 92,1. 7-10, p. I l l , 1.23-25, p. 112,1. 1. Larsen
opined that Watts breached his duty of loyalty by failing to enforce the completion time in
the Construction Contract. R. 8585, p. 184,1. 10-15. Watts agreed that the Construction
Contract required substantial completion sufficient for the Grand Opening within 15 months.
He agreed some delays occurred. R. 8586, pp. 516-517. The model was complete in
November, 1998. R. 8586, p. 409,1. 1-4. 3rd East's counsel asked Watts when the model
could have been completed but for the delays to which Watts responded he had no idea. R.
8586, p. 409,1.18-21. Watts also testified that in October, November landscaping and finish
work in the courtyard and lobby remained to be finished and that units were finished only
to a sheetrock stage. R. 8585, p. 257,1. 17-22.
About December 22,1998, Watts provided a punch list to Watts Corp insisting it get
the items done quickly and indicating the Grand Opening was to be January 22 or 29. Ex.
48; R. 8585, p. 295,1.16-23. At that point, windows and carpets needed to be cleaned, some
furnishings were needed, and the wallpaper in the hallways was being completed. R. 8585,
p. 296,1. 9-13.
The Watts Group placed the first two units under contract in January, 1999. Ex. 728.
The lobby and common areas were completed by February 1,1999. R. 8590, p. 1320,1. 6-8.
Will Ward (the Project superintendent) testified that the delay in completing the lobby may
have impacted sales. R. 8589, p. 1084,1. 1-8. The Grand Opening was held the weekend of
February 5, 1999. R. 8585, p. 296,1. 14-18; R. 8586, p. 409,1. 9-11. As agreed, both the
Watts Group and the Stevensen Group (Ted and Barbara Stevensen, and their son) worked
SE \Liz\R Watts v StevenserMppellate Brief v lOwpd

27

at the Project to sell units. A.D-1 §10.4.
Larsen testified that after they were more than a year out, The Club slowed down
because of the market and they didn't want to spend money because they didn't have money
to spend. R. 8584, p. 104,1. 1-23. Watts agreed that the reason the Club ran out of money
was because it had not borrowed enough to complete the Project and because of slow sales.
R. 8586, p. 407,1.9-12.
On or about March 9, 1999, Watts provided a memorandum to Stevensen informing
him that Watts Corp would be funding another $322,000.00 to pay construction bills. R.
8585, 0. 299,1. 20-23; Ex. 51. On June 1, 1999, Stevensen and Watts Corp executed two
Promissory Notes borrowing an additional $300,000 for The Club (A.D-8). That same day,
Watts Corp executed three more Promissory Notes borrowing additional funds for The Club
(A.D-9). That same month, the Bank granted its first of four extensions of the Bank Loan
(A.D-11 at Ex. 6 therein). RKW also made additional loans to The Club. A.D-1 (§ 6.1); AD.12 at Ex. 2, 793). RKW 94, another entity affiliated with Watts, also made loans to The
Club. A.D-11 at Ex. 2.
By the end of July, 1999, the Watts Group closed on 13 units with 34 units left to sell.
A.D-11 at Ex. 8. Watts testified that at that time there were some items of construction
remaining that did not relate to individual units. R. 8586, p. 385,1. 6-9. In July, 1999, the
city issued a Certificate of Occupancy. R. 8584, p. 92,1. 22-25. As of September 2, 1999,
31 units were not sold (A.D-11 at Ex. 8) and as of September 5, 1999, the projected total
costs of the Project were $9,624,350, with net sales income (gross sales minus closing costs
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and commissions) of $9,677,985. Watts sent Stevensen the 9/5/99 Proforma to that effect.
Ex. 24 (A.D-5).
As of September 11, 1999, the outstanding balance of the Bank Loan was
$2,349,200.45 (A.D-11 at Ex. 6). The total debt of The Club was $3,600,000. R. 8590, p.
1254,1. 18-25, p. 1255,1. 1-11. Stevensen and Watts had a meeting, about the reasons for
the reduction in projected profit to plus or minus $50,000. Stevensen said that Watts told
him it worked out that way. R. 8587, p. 630,1. 5-11. Stevensen claimed Watts fired him and
he left the Project. R. 8587, p. 631, 1. 12-13. Watts ceased making payments (the 1%
commission11 and $5,000 per month advance against profits12) to 3rd East. See also R. 8585,
p. 315,1. 16-23. The stipulated accounting gave 3rd East a credit for the commissions of
$53,242. A.D-11,12.
After obtaining four extensions, the Bank Loan was paid off about June 15, 2000.
A.D-11 at Ex. 6. The Club closed the sale of its last unit November 3, 2002. A.D-11 at Ex.
8. Larsen said he believed the construction could have been completed but for the redesigns
or the absence of the Architect within the projected 11 months, that the initial schedule
seemed reasonable to him. R. 8585, p. 128,1.14-24. Kesler testified that higher priced units
were selling faster in 1997. In 1998 higher priced units were selling slower. R. 8997, 8998.

11

The trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of 3rd East and against The
Club for failure to pay the 1% commission. R. 4018-4045 at 4027.
12

Counsel for 3rd East indicated to the trial court that the failure to pay the $5,000
a month draw was not a part of 3rd East's claim for breach of fiduciary duty or as a
contract claim. R. 8587, p. 686,1. 1-9, p. 738,1. 19-25; R. 8587.
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That was consistent with the projections of the Appraisal. R. 8998.
Larsen testified that "the result of Watts' decisions - and he was motivated to making
these decisions by what may benefit Watts Corporation aside from The Club." R. 8585, p.
186,1. 4-7. Larsen testified that he didn't know if he would have charged himself interest.
R. 8584, p. 110,1. 15. Larsen opined that Watts permitted Watts Corp to breach Section 3.1
of the Construction Contract (which requires the contractor to further the interests of the
owner) because the interests of the Owner to make a profit were furthered. A.D-2; R. 8584,
p. 89-92; R. 8585, p. 184,1. 10-22.
Stevensen testified that Watts told him one of the reasons for increased costs were the
marketing expenses. R. 8587, p. 630,1. 8-11.
The Fee, referenced in Section 4.1 of the Operating Agreement, payable to RKW was
booked in 2000 and reflected upon the capital account in the fmancials of The Club with
RKW's capital account increasing by $451,000.13 R. 8589, p. 1148,1. 5-25; p. 1149,1. 1-2;
A.D-1. In response to a notation found on a document not entered into evidence (Exhibit 396
[sic 663]), Deane Smith testified that The Club was booking the Fee December 31,2001 and
then expensing it in 2002 (3rd East claimed this was evidence of double booking in two years
[see Issue 4.2(F)]). R.8589, p. 1149,1. 24-25; pg 1150,1. 1-8.
3rd East did not receive $469,000 of its original capital contribution. Ex. 793; Ex. 796;

13

Whether or not the Fee should have been booked to the capital account of RKW
was resolved by the jury. The jury determined that booking the $451,000 to the capital
account of RKW was a breach of the Operating Agreement, but it was waived by the
defenses of waiver, acquiescence or estoppel. R. 8191.
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R. 8589, p. 1137,1. 18-21.
4.2

The Verdict of Gross Negligence/Willful Misconduct by Watts is not Supported

by Substantial Evidence. Jury verdicts may be overturned if, viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the verdict, there is no substantial evidence to support it. Canyon,
781 P.2d at 417; Billings, 918 P.2d at 467. Substantial evidence exists when the factual
findings support more than a mere scintilla of the evidence, though something less than the
weight of the evidence. Martinez, 2007 UT at ^[35. Because the Operating Agreement
authorized self-dealing by Watts, 3rd East bore the burden of proving by a preponderance of
the evidence that Watts breached his fiduciary duty to it with conduct amounting to gross
negligence or willful misconduct. SeeR. 7133-38. See also Jury Inst. 46, R. 8166. The jury
was instructed as to gross negligence (see Jury Inst. 34, R. 8454), in summary, the failure to
show even slight care. The jury was also instructed as to willful misconduct (see Jury Inst.
35, R. 8155) as:
the intentional doing of an act, or an intentional failure to do an act, in reckless
disregard of the consequences, and under such circumstances and conditions
that a reasonable person would know, or have reason to know, that such
conduct would, in a high degree of probability, result in harm to another.
3rd East failed to meet its burden.
A.

A Finding of No Breach of Contract Precludes a Finding of Gross Negligence.

The jury found that The Club did not breach Section 4.1 of the Operating Agreement, which
required 3rd East's approval to change the scope, nature, and budget of the Project. R. 8188.14
14

The jury did find that The Club breached the duty of good faith and fair dealing
(R.8192), but as a matter of law it could not have found that failing to obtain approvals
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If The Club did not breach Section 4.1, then its Manager, Watts, did not breach it or his
duties. Consequently, the Verdict against Watts cannot be based upon changes to the scope,
nature, or budget of the Project.
The majority of 3rd East's theories of liability, including extensions of time, increased
budgets, failure to attach budgets, failure to require architect supervision, and choice of the
type of Project, all boil down to an argument that changes equal costs and time resulting in
losses. Increasing the hard or soft costs of the proformas (A.D-5 which Stevensen
understood to mean a prediction or hope (R. 8587, p. 697,1. 8-12, 20)) could not constitute
breach of fiduciary duty as the jury found such was not a breach of the Operating Agreement.
R. 8188.
B.

Watts Had No Duty to Keep 3rd East Informed. In addition to increased costs, 3rd

East theorized that Watts breached his fiduciary duty by failing to keep it informed. 3rd East's
theory is without legal merit. The Utah Limited Liability Act (the "Act") and the Operating
Agreement do not impose upon the Manager a duty to inform members regarding the status
of the company. Under the terms of the Act, an LLC was to keep certain books and records
at its principal place of business. Utah Code Ann. §48-2b-l 19 (1996). Such records are
was the basis for that breach. It is axiomatic in the law, and the jury was so instructed,
that a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing cannot be based on exactly the
same acts which could form the basis for breach of express contract covenants. Jury Inst.
44, R. 8164. USX Corp. v. Prime Leasing. Inc., 988 F.2d 433, 439 (C.A. 3 1993) (stating
there is no implied covenant for matters specifically covered by the written contract).
Furthermore, Section 4.1 imposed limitations on the changes (i.e. Stevensen's approval)
and therefore, the duty of good faith and fair dealing cannot expand or alter those terms.
Markham v. Bradley. 2007 UT App 379, ^21, 173 P.3d 865, 872; Anapoell v. American
Express Business Fin. Corp., 2008 WL 2225849, *6 (D. Utah).
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subject to inspection and copying at the reasonable request and at the expense of any

member during ordinary business hours." Id. at §48-2b-l 19(2). In addition, the Operating
Agreement required (1) the establishment of capital and drawing accounts, and (2) changes
in the budget by approval (again, the jury found no breach). A.D-1, §§4.1, 7.1 and 7.2. It
is undisputed that before Stevensen left the Project in September 1999 (for whatever reason)
he never made a request to review the books and records.15 When Stevensen did finally
make the requests after September 1999, records were provided to him and he was told that
the books and records were available. R. 8586, p. 490,1. 10-15; A.D-10; Ex. 610.
Nevertheless, contrary to the Act which imposes a duty upon the member to request
specific records if desired, the jury was instructed that under the law of fiduciary duty, a
manager has an obligation to make a true and full disclosure of "all information" affecting
the affairs of the company if the information is relevant and material to the manager's
dealings with the member. Jury Inst. 49, R. 8170. Even if this obligation is imposed upon
the manager by virtue of the Operating Agreement its only application would be to provide
true disclosure to obtain 3rd East's approval for increases in the budget. The Operating
Agreement imposed no other disclosure obligation upon Watts. On this issue the jury found

15

R. 8587, p. 30,1. 24-25 (Stevensen testified that he never quizzed or questioned
anyone.); R. 8589, p. 955,1. 3-5, p. 1016,1. 4-16, p. 1053,1. 11-17 (Watts Corp office
manager testifying that she met with Stevensen once a month to give him his draw, but he
never asked for any information); R. 8586, p. 489,1. 24-25, p. 490,1. 1-9 (Watts testifying
that he provided information to Stevensen and Stevensen never asked for anything more.
If he had, Watts would have given it to him.); R. 8586, p. 490,1. 20-24 (Watts never
denied Stevensen information); R. 8590, p. 1238,1. 22-25, p. 1239,1. 1-6 (Watts testifying
that Stevensen never asked for budgeting updates.).
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no breach. R. 8188.
Furthermore, even if Watts had a duty of disclosure, it was met as a matter of law as
the information was available to 3rd East for its review. The Utah Supreme Court has held
that where a partner has full access to partnership records, as is his right, then a claim of
breach of fiduciary duty on the grounds of affirmatively failing to disclose information
cannot be sustained. Burke v. Farrell 656 P.2d 1015, 1017 (Utah 1972) (citing Utah Code
Ann. §48-1-16). See also Walter v. Holiday Inns. Inc.. 784 F. Supp. 1159, 1171 (U.S. Dist.
Ct. N.J. 1992) (directed verdict would be proper on breach of fiduciary duty claim where
plaintiffs had access to the company's books and records). Furthermore, when partners or
members are given projections as to future valuations and the partner or member has the right
to review the information to make future valuations there is no breach of fiduciary duty.
Walter, 748 F. Supp. at 1171.
As in Burke, 3rd East had the right to request available information regarding the
company. See Utah Code Ann. §48-2b-119 (1996). There is no testimony by Stevensen
claiming that he asked for information and it was refused! Stevensen attended coordination
meetings. He knew when and where they were being held and was only asked to leave once
due to unrelated business. R. 8587, p. 646,1. 15-25, p. 647,1. 1-9, p. 615,1. 6-25, p. 649,1.
9-11, p. 1053,1. 11-17. Stevensen himself testified that he didn't quiz or question anyone.
R. 8587, p. 30,1.24-25. Stevensen signed or initialed documents without ever reading them,
he threw documents away and he wasn't concerned about costs. R. 8587, p. 636,1. 2-10, p.
716,1. 13-19, 22-25, p. 703,1. 12-20, p. 705,1. 15-22, p. 706,1. 15-22, p. 717,1. 1-4, p. 723,
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1. 22-25, p. 724.
Backing Into Profit Projection. Larsen testified that he believed Watts backed into
his profit projections as the profits remained the same even though costs increased. Watts
agreed that the profit projections remained the same as costs increased and Kesler testified
that the profit margin decreased as costs increased. However, 3rd East did not present any
testimony of any unnecessary changes. Nor did any of 3rd East's witnesses opine as to
whether or not the projected unit prices were accurate or even reasonable based upon the
changes. Larsen admitted that he did not have any opinion as to what the sales prices should
have been for the units as he was not a real estate expert and had no opinion regarding the
market. R. 8584, p. 79, 1. 15-16; R. 8585, p. 205, 1. 12-15. Larsen's testimony was
speculation. Experts are not permitted to speculate. Thurston, 2003 UT App. at ^20.
C.

Larsen's Opinion Was Based on Several Obvious Errors of Fact. Where an

expert's opinion is obviously false it is not substantial evidence and will not support a jury
verdict. United States v. Hill 62 F.2d 1022, 1025 (C.A. 8 1933).
Architect not overseeing the construction. The evidence established that not only did
Dazely oversee the Project for the Architect, but so did an independent architect for the Bank.
R. 8590, p. 1298,1. 21-23; R. 8585, p. 250,1. 25, p. 251,1. 1; R. 8586, p. 491,1. 25, p. 492,
1. 1-4, p. 493,1. 23-25, p. 494,1. 1, p. 513,1. 1-9, p. 515,1. 10-23; R. 8588, p. 987,1. 16-18.
Larsen testified he did not know who Dazely was although he admitted to seeing his name
as attending the coordination meetings. R. 8585, p. 169,1.1-4. Dazely5s presence is reflected
in at least half of the Club Coordination Meeting Minutes admitted into evidence. See Ex.
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552.
No Daily Reports: Despite claiming to have reviewed 30 boxes of documents, Larsen
testified that he did not see any Daily Reports in the construction records and that showed
a lack of care by the contractor. R. 8584, p. 94,1. 1-5, p. 112,1. 14-25. The Daily Reports
(consisting of 238 pages) were introduced into evidence. See Ex. 488.
Architect Not Reviewing Shop Drawings: Correspondence regarding Dazely' s review
and involvement with shop drawings was discussed and introduced at trial. R. 8585, p. 168,
1. 14-25, p. 169,1. 1-4.
Not Pushing Subcontractors to Perform: Larsen opined that he did not see any
evidence that the contractor was pushing subs to perform. 3rd East's own counsel later
caused a memorandum to be admitted into evidence from Watts Corp to a subcontractor
demanding that he perform work and threatening to backcharge him if he does not perform.
Ex. 42; R. 8585, p. 285,1. 9-25, p. 286,1. 1-25, p. 287,1. 1-18.
D.

Larsen's Testimony Was Based in Large Part Upon Speculation and Nonsense.
Experts are not permitted to speculate. Thurston, 2003 UT App at f 20; Goebel, 215

F. 3d at 1087. Furthermore, expert testimony will not support a verdict if it is nonsense.
Hill, 62 F.2d at 1025.
Delay = Damage: Larsen opined that Watts breached his fiduciary duty by not causing
the Project to be completed in its entirety sooner, if it had, The Club could have decreased
its interest obligations to the Bank. He opined: The faster you finish the more money you
make, the shorter your loan is to the bank because interest typically will decrease once
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construction is finished. R. 8584, p. 112, 1. 8-11. Larsen agreed that his opinion was
contingent upon buyers being available to buy the units. However, Larsen did not know if
there were any buyers in the marketplace to purchase the units at any earlier date such that
the interest costs could be cut off. R. 8585, p. 160,1.23-25, p. 161,1. 1-12. His opinion that
interest could have decreased was pure speculation.
Furthermore, Watts explained that they/he made the business decision to wait for a
buyer before they completed the finishes in a unit so they didn't borrow money and have to
pay interest on that money too. R. 8586, p. 385,1. 2-5; R. 8590, p. 1253,1. 13-16, p. 1316,
1. 15-25, p. 1317,1. 1-9, p. 1318,1. 12-13. p. 1270, 1. 25, p. 1271, 1. 1-3. The jury was
instructed that when exercising business judgment, a manager may make mistakes and that
is not gross negligence or willful misconduct. See Jury Inst. 51, R. 8172. Logically, if more
money had been spent to finish the units without buyers, then more interest would have been
incurred as they waited for buyers. It is undisputed that it took more than three years to sell
out the Project. A-D-l 1 at Ex. 8. Watts' business decision based on sound logic and made
with the intention to save money cannot be the basis for a finding of breach of fiduciary duty.
However, Larsen opined that the solution was to finish all the units, whether or not
there were buyers, and get a new loan. R. 8585, p. 161,1. 13-25, p. 162,1.1-23. A new loan
would carry its own interest. No evidence was presented that a new loan could have been
obtained at a lower rate. That was simply an opinion based upon "nonsense clothed in words
of 'learned length'". Hill, 62 F.2d at 1025.
Changes by the Contractor: Larsen testified that Watts Corp as the contractor was
SE \Liz\R Watts v Stevensen\Appellate Brief v lOwpd

* I

permitted to make constant changes to the Project with no controls by the Architect
reviewing costs contrary to the industry standards. He likened it to a contractor making
changes while building your house without your knowledge. However, each change initiated
by Watts was a change initiated by the owner. When changes were made, the owner knew.
The jury found no breach on this issue. Larsen's testimony was nonsense. Hill 62 F.2d at
1025.
Costs for Faulty Construction. Larsen opined that the absence of the Architect's
oversight of the construction may have caused The Club to pay for faulty construction. He
could not identify any but said it was likely there was some. R. 8584, p. 94,1. 7-9. Again,
speculation.
Delay Caused by Changes: The Construction Contract permitted extensions of time
due to owners changes. A.D-2 at §42. Therefore, any delay because of changes was agreed
to (again the changes, which increased costs, were approved).
Failure to Attach Documents to the Construction Contract: Watts explained without
challenge that the documents referenced in Section 16.1.7 and not attached to the
Construction Contract did not exist because they were still working on bidding and pricing
at that time. R. 8590, p. 1215,1. 16-25, p. 1216,1. 1. Furthermore, Stevensen signed the
Construction Contract on behalf of The Club. As the Owner's representative, Stevensen also
had duties to act for the Owner in matters relative to the execution of the Construction
Contract. Larsen testified that it would have been wise for Stevensen to insure that exhibits
were attached to the Construction Contract. R. 8585, p. 198, 1. 13-25, p. 199, 1. 1, 6-11.
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Therefore, the failure is attributable to 3rd East, not just Watts.
Increasing Costs to Benefit Watts Corp. Larsen did not think Watts' motivation was
to increase payments to Watts Corp (that was simply the result of his actions). R. 8585, p.
151,1.9-11. He testified that Watts' intent was to create a monument or to create value for
potential buyers. Larsen relied on Watts' deposition testimony that he hoped Watts Corp had
a good reputation and his intent was to create the best product that he could for the
marketplace. It is undisputed that the purpose of the Project was to create a product to sell
for profit. Wattsf entity, RKW, was a 50% owner of The Club. As such, RKW would be
entitled to 50% of the profits. It is simply illogical to assert that Watts would increase costs
to make 8% on a Construction Contract (and even that 8% was dependent upon sales R.
8586, p. 505,1. 20-23) when he, via his entity, RKW, could receive more from 50% of the
profits.16
Borrowing Less Money from the Bank: There is absolutely no evidence that the plan
to borrow less money from the Bank was gross negligence or willful misconduct. Watts
testified without challenge that borrowing money from private lenders actually saved The
Club money on extension fees and closing costs. R. 8586, p. 399,1. 4-11; p. 480,1. 7-25; p.
481, 1. 1-10. This testimony was undisputed and ratified by Kesler who opined that the
decision to borrow less money from the bank was a good decision on the part of the
developer as a cost saving measure. R. 8998. Acting to save The Club money is the exercise

16

Mathematically Watts would have to increase the construction costs by
$5,000,000 to obtain an equal projected profit of $400,000 as a 50% member.
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of care. In addition, the plan was the exercise of business judgment which the jury was
instructed that Watts may make even if he falls into mistake (which he did not). Jury Inst.
51, R. 8172.
Watts' Failure to Cause The Club to Pay 3rd East for land, profit and 1% fee.
Managing the cash flow of The Club under circumstances where the profitability of the
Project was in question is one of the key responsibilities of the Manager. The Act provided
a statutory prohibition against making distributions to Members if after giving effect to the
distribution, the fair value of The Club's assets would be less than the total liabilities of the
Company. §48-2b-128 (A.A-2). The undisputed evidence was that in September 1999 a
minimal profit of $50,000 or possibly a loss of $50,000 was projected. A.D-5 (Ex. 24). 3rd
East's share was plus or minus $25,000. As of September, 3rd East had already received
distributions against profits of $162,000. Watts knew that 3rd East had no means to repay
further distributions. R.8586, p. 425,1. 8-22. Watts knew that he had an obligation to pay
creditors first before he paid members. R. 8586, p. 507,1.15-25. See also A.D-14 (members
agreeing to pay profits last). Therefore, it would have been imprudent and probably a
violation of law to make further distributions to 3rd East. Obviously, the booking of a entry
in a budget or for that matter evidence of equity within a capital account (due to the
contribution of land) is not evidence of the availability of actual funds for payment. The
evidence before the Court is that at all times during construction and until the sale of the last
Unit, The Club's assets were primarily unsold condominium units which do not equate to
available funds for distributions. The Deane Smith Accounting prepared at the conclusion
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of the Project demonstrated that after giving 3rd East credit for all distributions and the 1%
commissions, 3rd East was in fact over-disbursed. A.D-11,12. This evidence confirms not
only the absence of gross negligence by Watts, but that his conduct was prudent.
Because of the need to sell and close 3 lunits which were unfinished it was necessary
to spend money to market the units, to pay interest upon the Company loans, and to finish the
units to conditions which would permit the sale of the units. To freeze the Project in
September in its incomplete status is 3rd East's attempt to second guess the business
judgment of Watts whose decisions ultimately resulted in the sale of all units. To argue that
further changes, if any, should not have been made at this point in time is not supported by
anything but speculation. Again, there is no testimony of unnecessary costs or changes. To
be sure, there is a complete absence of proof of Watts' indifference or the absence of even
the slightest care. As Larsen himself stated, they weren't throwing money away. R. 8584,
p. 109,1. 6-11, 13-16. The intent of any redesign or changes was to create more value for a
prospective buyer. R. 8585, p. 207, 1. 9-15. Watts' intent evidences the interests of the
owners of pleasing the customers so that sales could be made. See also R. 8586, p. 370,1.
7-16. Larsen simply testified that he did not see any evidence that an investigation was made
to ensure that the sales prices would increase proportionately to the cost increases, but again
he could not testify regarding sales prices as he was not an expert. R. 8584, p. 108,1.18-25;
R. 8585, p. 206,1.5-15.
E.

The Manager may rely upon experts and be fully protected from his actions. A

Manager may rely upon experts and be fully protected. Jury Inst. 52., R. 8173.
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Withholding Payments: It is evident that based upon the letter from counsel to
Stevensen on October 1999 (A.D-10), Watts was relying upon the advice of counsel, an
expert, in withholding payments to 3rd East. Consequently, Watts, actions are fully protected
from personal liability. In addition, based upon the facts in September, 1999, Watts was
acting in accordance with the Act.
Watts' disagreement with the Appraisal. Watts was free to disagree with other
members of the builder and real estate community and doing so is not engaging in gross
negligence or willful misconduct. Jury Inst. 51, R. 8172. The flaw in 3rd East's proof is clear
in the evidence presented by Watts that he relied on his own expertise (and 3rd East stipulated
that he had the expertise) and the expertise of his marketing team at the Watts Group. R.
8586, pp. 404-06; R. 8588, pp. 819-20, 839, 866 and 867; R. 8590, pp. 1273-74.
Furthermore, Watts' real estate expert, George Richards, testified that he felt The Club made
the right design decision for the Salt Lake City marketplace at the time. R. 8588, p. 812,1.
7-13. Based upon the foregoing testimony, Watts must, as a matter of law, be fully protected
from liability.
F.

3rd East theorized that the Fee was double booked into RKW's Capital Account.

The evidence beyond 3rd East's mere speculation conclusively establishes the Fee was
booked only once. See A.D-11 at p. 1; R. 6966-75.
If the capital account would have been credited twice in the amount of $451,000, as
3rd East argued, the total capital account of RKW at the conclusion of year 2002 would have
been $1,368,380 ($917,380 + $451,000) and not $917,380. A.D-11 (p. 2 of Ex. 2 therein).
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The stipulated Smith accounting shows incremental increases in RKW's capital account
totaling $325,380 in calendar years 1997,1998 and 1999; adding these incremental amounts
to $902,000 (twice the Fee) would equal $ 1,227,380 even if the cash contributions from 1996
are not considered. As reflected on the Smith accounting, RKW's capital account never
exceeded $917,360. More importantly, no additions were made to RKW's capital account
in calendar years 2001 or 2002, the years that 3rd East contends the double booking occurred.
A.D-11 (p. 2 of Ex. 2). Of equal importance, Teuscher couldn't find even one booking of
the Fee which was and is acknowledged in the stipulated accounting. A.D-11; R. 8587, p.
587,1. 24-25, p. 588,1. 1-14. If two bookings existed, the probabilities are that Teuscher
should have found at least one.
3rd East merely confuses the issue of "booking" verses "expensing" the Fee. The
financial statements of the Club (A.D-11, p. 2 of Ex. 2) show that "booking" the Fee (in other
words entering it for the first time on the balance sheet) is necessarily a double entry. First,
it was entered as a debit to assets ("Work in Process - Develop Fee") much like the land
obtained from 3rd East was booked as an asset ("Work in Process- Land" see A.D-11 at Ex.
2), and then it was entered as a credit to the capital account of RKW. 3rd East acknowledges
that this occurred in the calendar year 2000 (although A.D-11 p. 2 of Ex. 2 (the summary)
reflects that it occurred as early as 1996). R. 8590, p. 1366,1.12-24. The "expensing" of the
Fee (in other words treating the Fee as an expense of the Project) occurred in the calendar
year 2002. Id. First, the amount of the Fee ($451,000) was debited to the expenses of the
Project (thus recognizing the Fee as an expense of the Project for profit and loss calculations)
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and then the amount of the "Work in Process - Develop Fee" ($451,000) was credited to the
asset category to remove it from assets.

Basic accounting demonstrates that it is only

booking the Fee that results in a credit to the capital account of RKW (again the summary
of the Liddle & Waite financials (A.D-11, Ex. 2) does not reflect a double booking) and that
expensing the Work in Process - Develop Fee has no impact at all on RKW's capital account.
Consequently, there is no credible evidence that the Fee was booked twice to the capital
account of RKW.17
The evidence presented at trial, even viewed in a light most favorable to 3rd East does
not support a finding of breach of fiduciary duty by gross negligence or willful misconduct.
4.3

The Verdict is not Supported by Substantial Evidence that Any Misconduct was

the Proximate Cause of Damages Beyond Mere Speculation. No matter what theories 3rd
East may espouse and even if we assume for purposes of argument that Watts engaged in
gross negligence or willful misconduct, the evidence did not establish beyond mere
speculation that the conduct was the proximate cause of harm. Proximate cause may not be
established by expert testimony that represents a mere guess or speculation, or worse, "I
don't know." Thurston. 834 P.3d 397; Clark v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 893 P.2d 598, 601
(Utah Ct. App. 1995). Furthermore, expert testimony must not be contrary to the facts, based
on insufficient data, or nonsense. Hill 62 F.2d at 1025. However, that is all 3rd East
provided. To be sure, the theme of 3rd East's experts was "I don't know."

17

The jury found that The Club was excused from any breach in granting RKW a
credit to its capital account for the Fee and the $180,000. Verdict, R.8191 (A.C-5).
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3rd East's key expert, Larsen, testified that changes increase costs and cause delay.
When asked what changes were made to the Project he was only able to identify one, but he
did not know the effect of it, he only speculated that the change would not have been to save
money. R. 8584, p. 96,1. 23-25, p. 97,1. 1-2; R. 8585, p. 155,1. 9-25, p. 156,1. 8-19.18 He
was unable to identify any other changes. R. 8584, p. 97, 1. 2; R. 8585, p. 153, 1. 13-15.
When asked whether changes were made to unit plans, floor plans, parking areas, or
hallways, his response was "I don't know." R. 8585, p. 155,1. 18-25, p. 156,1. 1-7. He did
testify that the total configuration of the building did not change after the plans were
complete. R. 8585, p. 153,1. 15-16.
One of the key aspects of Larsen's testimony was that he did not see any evidence of
investigation of the value of changes. However, despite not being able to identify them, and
admitting that the changes were intended to and did add value he said, "I'm not sure if they
increased proportionately to the selling price." R. 8585, p. 206,1. 11-15 (emphasis added);
R. 8587, p. 207,1. 4-15. Larsen admitted that he was not a real estate expert and could not
opine as to the pricing of units. R. 8585, p. 160,1. 19-22; R. 8584, p. 79,1. 15-16.
Further, Larsen did not know: (1) what changes were necessary or unnecessary (while
admitting that some were necessary (R. 8585, p. 159, 1. 16-20)); (2) what costs were
unnecessary (R. 8585, p. 159,1.21-25); (3) what specific changes added value to the Project
(while admitting that some did (R. 8585, p. 160, 1. 4-7)); or (4) what changes may have

18

Dazely, however, established that the change to the mechanical vents system
was a necessary change that saved money. R. 8588, p. 924,1. 17-25, p. 925,1. 1.
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resulted in a sale (R. 8585, p. 160,1. 15-18).
Larsen suggested the possibility of unnecessary costs by opining that because the
Architect did not conduct site visits (an opinion against the clear weight of evidence) there
were no reports of faulty construction for which the contractor should not be paid. Larsen
stated that he could not identify any faulty construction, but it is likely there was some. R.
8584, p. 93,1. 4-25, p. 94,1. 1-18. Again, that was speculation.
Not only did he not know of the unnecessary changes, but Larsenfs opinion was not
grounded in facts. He based his opinion that there were unnecessary changes upon two
passages from Watts' deposition testimony. The first was that Watts was building to the
marketplace and he hoped Watts Corp had a good reputation. R. 8585, p. 150,1.2-25, p. 151,
1. 1. The second was that construction took longer because of the finishes (while ignoring
the remainder of his answer that they would not finish individual units until they found a
buyer). R. 8590, p. 1319,1.4-22. However, neither of those passages conveyed information
pertaining to unnecessary changes, but rather that changes were made in order to sell units.
R. 8586, p. 515,1. 24-25, p. 516,1. 1-11. Likewise, Watts' trial testimony explaining the
remainder of his deposition answer did not reference unnecessary changes, but just the
opposite. R. 8590, p. 1316,1. 25, p. 1317,1. 1-19.
Not being able to identify any specific changes, Larsen simply said that all he had was
the end result of the changes "There was an increase and extend[sic] the duration of
performance which Mr. Watts said resulted from the changes." R. 8585, p. 153,1.25; p. 154,
1. 1-2. Again Watts5 complete answer was there was delay because of the finishes and that
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they were not completing the finishes in individual units until they found a buyer.
When asked when the Project could have been completed but for the changes (that he
was unable to identify or opine as to whether they were necessary or unnecessary) and the
absence of the architect, Larsen speculated:
A
I believe that the Watts Corporation could have completed it within in
the 11 months had there been no changes. I believe there (inaudible)
performance where the Watts Corporation anticipated completion by a certain
date. They were months off. Pve not made an independent time analysis. All
I can recall is the representations made by the Watts Corporation which
seemed reasonable to me.
R. 8585, p. 128,1. 14-24. He had no idea. He simply based his opinion on a preliminary
schedule generated by Watts Corp before construction even started.19
3rd East's other experts were similarly deficient. Teuscher did not have any opinion
whether the actual costs incurred to build were or were not necessary. R. 8587, p. 596,1.1417. He did not have any opinion whether or not the actual costs were incurred in order to sell
the units. R. 8587, p. 596,1. 18-21. He did not have any opinion whether or not additional
interest and finance costs incurred versus the projected interest and finance costs were
necessarily incurred. R. 8587, p. 600,1. 24-25, p. 601,1. 1-6. Likewise Kesler did not have
any opinion regarding the changes other than that changes in the construction budget resulted
in the loan being out of balance, but again he didn't know if that problem had been cured
although he did know that the Bank did not foreclose. R. 8993-94. Furthermore, Watts1
testimony that borrowing funds from private lenders versus borrowing funds from the Bank
19

Referring to Ex. 41. But see A.D-2 and Larsen's admission that it was
acceptable to give themselves 15 months in the contract. R. 8584, p. 91,1. 2-13.
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saved The Club money, was uncontested. R. 8586, p. 399,1.4-11; p. 480,1. 7-25; p. 481,1.
1-10. Kesler in fact agreed that borrowing less money was good decision as a cost saving
measure on the part of the developer, just not for the bank. R. 8998.
Causes for Delay other than Changes: Larsen admitted that there were intervening
causes. He admitted that delay resulted from the market. R. 8584, p. 105,1.1-5. Larsen also
opined that the construction slowed because they didn't want to spend money because they
didn't have money to spend. R. 8584, p. 104,1. 17-23. However, Larsen could not assign a
percentage of causation to either. R. 8584, p. 105,1. 6-11.
Furthermore, the claims that they didn't have money to spend was the proximate cause
of delay is simply nonsensical and not supported by the evidence. The evidence established
that The Club borrowed additional funds as needed. A.D-6, 8,9,11 at Ex. 2 therein, and Ex.
793.
3rd East attempted to argue, without any proof, that the Project caused the slow-down
in the market; however, in response to such questioning Watts' real estate expert (3rd East did
not present their own expert), Richards, testified that was not likely and impossible to
quantify. R. 8588, p. 795,1.2-5. Stevensen himself admitted that he had no idea what caused
the slow sales market. R. 8587, p. 673,1. 9-14.
Watts established that there were other causes of delay.

For example, Watts

established that the Project suffered weather delays. R. 8586, p. 381,1. 11-18; R. 8590, p.
1216,1. 23-25, p. 1217,1. 1-19. Mr. Ward (the Project manager) testified that he kept track
of weather delays in the Daily Project Reports (Ex. 488). Mr. Ward testified that
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conservatively there could have been at least 14 V2 days where work could not be performed
because of weather. One lost day could equate to weeks of delay. Weather is beyond the
control of the contractor. R. 8589, p. 1085,1.2-13, p. 1067,1.10-25, p. 1068,1.1-25, p. 1069,
1. 1-9; Ex. 488.
Bob Whitney of the Watts Group opined that the Stevensen Group's inability to sell
contributed to the slow sales and probably had a twelve-month impact on the sales. R. 8588,
p. 876,1. 15-25. Where a party has contributed to delay, they are not entitled to recover
damages for the delay. Higgins v. City of Fillmore. 639 P.2d 192, 193 (Utah 1981).
Larsen's criticism of items that differed from an arms-length transaction. Larsen
criticized certain aspects of the transaction that differed from a typical arms-length
transaction. But none of the issues that he identified was the proximate cause of any harm.
(1) Low Liability Limits in Architect's Contract (A.D-3): No evidence of any claims made
for faulty design or construction against the Architect. Am. Comp. (A.C-1). (2) Architect's
Failure to Review Shop Drawings: Watts produced evidence that the Architect did in fact
review shop drawings. R. 8585, p. 168, 1. 14-25, p. 169, 1. 1-4. Moreover, there was no
evidence regarding any damage for this failure even if it did occur and therefore no proof of
proximate cause of an harm. (3) Architect's Failure to Provide Certificate of Final Payment:
It is the banker that wants the Certificate of Final Payment. R. 8588, p. 949, 1. 3-5. No
claims have been made by the Bank. (4) Architect's Failure to Review Construction Draws:
A lot of provisions in the Architect's contract are for inexperienced owners (such as
reviewing draw requests), and if services are requested, the costs to the owner would
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increase. R. 8588, p. 943,1.15-22, p. 988,1.2-15. 3rd East's counsel acknowledged that The
Club' s representative was not inexperienced when he stated: "In this case we have a situation
more like that, don't we, because Russell Watts as the owner of The Club Condominiums LC
or as acting as the manager of the owner, he knows a lot about construction and Russell
Watts acting as president of Watts Corporation knows a lot about construction and in fact all
the work that has been done by Watts Corporation is known to Mr. Watts as both president
of the company and the manager of the condominiums." R. 8588, p. 943,1. 23-25, p. 944,
1. 1-5. Similarly, the Architect opined that Watts, the representative of The Club and Watts
Corp was capable of reviewing the construction draws and that had he reviewed the draws
he would have charged his time therefore adding to the costs of the Project. R. 8588, p. 927,
1. 10-23. Larsen opined that the failure of the Architect to oversee the draws permitted the
contractor to make changes. This opinion is irrelevant to this transaction. In this transaction,
Watts acted on behalf of Watts Corp and on behalf of The Club as its manager when he
reviewed the draw requests. Obviously, the owner, The Club, by its agent, Watts, is informed
with every draw request. Furthermore, the jury found that there was no breach for making
the changes.
3rd East completely failed to prove the amount of the damage beyond mere
speculation. See Issue No. 2. Where the amount of the damage is left to speculation a
damage award is not appropriate. Atkm, 709 p.2d at 336-37. To begin to quantify damages
for delay there needed to be an opinion as to when the Project could be completed. Larsen
could only speculate.

Larsen simply opined that the entire Project should have been
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completed faster because the faster you finish the more money you make, the shorter your
loan is to the bank because interest typically will decrease once construction is finished. R.
8584, p. 112,1. 8-11. Larsen admitted that 3rd East's premise that the Project should have
been finished faster presupposed that there was a buyer to buy the units at that time. R. 8585,
p. 160,1.23-25, p. 161,1.1-2. However, Larsen did not know if there were any buyers in the
marketplace to purchase the units at any earlier date such that the interest costs could be cut
off. R. 8585, p. 160,1. 23-25, p. 161,1. 1-12. His opinion was again "I don't know." With
respect to the decision not to finish units until they found a buyer, Larsen opined that they
should have finished all the units, whether or not there were buyers, and get a new loan. R.
8585, p. 161,1. 13-25, p. 162,1. 1-23. However, no testimony was provided that The Club
could have saved money with a better interest rate. To be sure when questioned as to
whether a new loan would also bear interest he simply stated that he was not an expert in the
banking industry. The undisputed evidence established that even when the units were on the
market it still took until November 2002 to sell out the Project. A.D-11 at Ex. 8; R. 8590,
p. 1317,1.10-16. It is a matter of common sense that had The Club spent the money to finish
out all of the units and then still had to wait the proven 48 months to sell the units that the
interests costs would have been higher. There is NO EVIDENCE that the outcome would
have been different if the units had all been completed and available earlier. Rather the
evidence at trial established that The Club could have turned out like the other projects that
came on the market at that time, in the same price range, that went into foreclosure, or still
had units to sell in 2007. R. 8588, p. 786,1. 21-25, p. 787,1. 1-14, p. 871,1. 7-19. Therefore,
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had The Club spend all the money up front the situation, could have been worse.
3rd East's economic expert, Teuscher, did not provide any helpful testimony. He did
not opine regarding lost sales. Teuscher testified that he was not a real estate expert and did
not have an opinion as to whether or not the real estate market was difficult during the sales
period. R. 8587, p. 596, 1. 22-25, p. 597, 1. 1-3. He did not have an opinion as to the
adequacy of sales prices of the units. R. 8587, p. 597,1. 11-15. He did not provide any
calculations for delay costs. R. 8587, p. 597,1. 21-25. He had no opinion as to whether or
not construction costs or administrative costs were necessarily incurred or not. R. 8587, p.
589,1. 15-25, p. 590,1. 1-24.
Teuscher provided two damage scenarios, but did not, however, provide objective
facts, figures and data required for the jury to establish damages in the form of lost net profits
under the law. Ex. 97 (A.D-7). In each analysis, Teuscher accepted the net revenue (gross
sales minus closing costs) and the value of the land from the stipulated accounting. R. 8587,
p. 585, 1. 25, p. 586, 1. 1-4. He then testified that the jury could look to the actual
construction costs20 and the actual administrative and other costs21 to determine what costs
were necessarily incurred or not, but did not provide an opinion as to either. R. 8587, p. 589,
1. 15-25, p. 590,1. 1-24. While a true statement, there was no evidence for the jury to
determine what costs were unnecessary, or what sales were lost or could have been had
20

A.D-7 at Ex. C. Note the financial expert indicated that all costs below the
construction costs on Exhibit C were not adjustable although he excluded some without
explanation. R. 8587, p. 589,1. 14-22.
21

A.D-7 at Ex. D.
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(an issue upon which he did not have an opinion).22 R. 8587, p. 596,1. 14-25, p. 597,1. 1-3,
11-15, p. 600, 1. 24-25, p. 601,1. 1-6, p. 601,1. 17-24. He did not have an opinion as to
whether the sales prices of the units were appropriate or adequate. R. 8587, p. 597,1.11-15.
Watts' financial expert, Mr. Smith, testified:
Q
Yes. I want to refer to his financial [Teuscher's] summary report and
it's several pages. I'm going to show you Page 1 there, that's one financial
summary. There was another financial summary, No. 2. Anywhere in that
report is there a figure that I can look to that says delays caused by Watts
resulted in 'x' amount of dollars of damage?
A
No.
R. 8589, p. 1174,1.1-8.
There was no evidence that a lower priced project could have been sold with any
better results. Kesler simply testified that higher priced units were selling slower in 1998.
R. 8992-8999, at 8994,8997. That blanket statement does nothing to prove damages beyond
mere speculation. There is no evidence of how much faster lower priced units were selling,
what prices constituted lower priced units, and what costs would have been incurred to build
such units. Furthermore, there is no evidence of how lower priced units were selling in 1999
when the Project actually went on the market or later. Even 3rd East's attempts to use the
Appraisal cannot establish damages. That was nothing but a forward-looking projection, not
evidence of what occurred in the market.
3rd East's counsel attempted to have Watts speculate about possible sales if they had
completed a model sooner and held their grand opening in October or November as they had
22

3rd East's counsel nevertheless acknowledged its burden to provide information
to the jury so they could make those adjustments. R. 8587, p. 591,1. 2-4.
si
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hoped to do. Watts was unable to quantify any lost sales or sales that could have been made.
R. 8586, p. 409,1. 16-21. While damages need not be proven with specificity, they must be
proven beyond mere speculation.
Marketing Costs.

None of 3rd East's experts testified that any costs were

unnecessarily incurred on the Project; this failure most certainly included marketing costs.
Teuscher, the economic expert, did not have any opinion as to whether or not the actual costs
were incurred in order to sell the units. R. 8587, p.596, 1. 18-21. He did not have any
opinion as to whether the $374,750 in marketing costs versus the $25,000 in marketing costs
projected on the 10/21/97 Proforma were necessarily incurred. R. 8587, p. 601,1.17-24. He
simply said that to miss the budget by that amount of money would be unusual and there
would need to be some determination there as to how much of that was necessary and how
much of it was a panicked effort to sell units. R. 8587, p. 590,1. 15-19. However he had no
guidance to give in that regard. He was not a real estate expert and did not have an opinion
as to whether or not the real estate market was difficult during the sales period. R. 8587, p.
596,1. 22-25, p. 597,1. 1-3.
Larsen could not identify one unnecessary cost for the Project. R. 8585, p. 159,1. 825, p. 160, 1. 1-22; R. 8584, p. 79,1. 15-16. Larsen had nothing to add regarding the real
estate market or marketing as by his own admission he was not a real estate expert. R. 8584,
p. 79, 1. 15-16; R. 8585, p. 160, 1. 19-22. Kesler, the banking expert, had nothing to say
regarding marketing costs. (The record is devoid of any such testimony and therefore, there
is nothing to cite.)
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3rd East did not present a real estate expert to testify as to what amounts were
unnecessarily spent on marketing. 3rd East attempted to rely on Watts' real estate expert to
prove its damages, but that was similarly to no avail. Watts' real estate marketing expert,
Richards, testified that he would have considered paying some advertising expenses if he
were to be paid a 3% sales commission, but the amount was not established. R. 8588, pp.
810-811. Richards also indicated that he would have taken at least a full 5% commission on
in-home sales. R. 8588,p.813,l. 9-17. The only real testimony in the record regarding how
much a real estate agent would contribute to advertising costs came from Watts himself who
testified that in his experience outside brokers would charge 5-6% and would pay perhaps
$10,000. R. 8586, p. 450,1. 9-23; R. 8590, p. 1280,1. 22-25, p. 1281,1. 1-5. Nothing was
ever established beyond that. The evidence established by 3rd East did nothing but foster
speculation as to what could have been. While not required to be proven with specificity,
damages must be proven beyond mere speculation.
ISSUE NO. 5. Is 3rd East entitled to an award of prejudgment interest when damages are left
to the best judgment of the jury?
The trial court committed reversible error by awarding 3rd East pre-judgment interest
when the evidence did not conform to standards for prejudgment interest prescribed by Utah
law. A trial court's decision to grant or deny prejudgment interest presents a question of law
which is reviewed for correctness. Corma, 898 P.2d at 1387. The Utah Supreme Court has
held that:
[Prejudgment interest should be denied in cases where damages are
determined by exercising the broad discretion of the fact finder, for instance,
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"[i]n all personal injury cases, cases of death by wrongful act, libel, slander,
false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, assault and battery, and all cases
where the damages are incomplete and are peculiarly within the province of
the jury to assess at the time of trial."
Iron Head. 2008 UT App atfflf6, 9 (quoting and reaffirming Fell v. Union Pac. Ry. Co.. 88
P. 1003, 1006 (Utah 1907)) (alteration in original). Thus, where damages are to be
determined by the best judgment of the jury rather than fixed standards then prejudgment
interest is inappropriate. Id.; Cornia, 898 P.2d at 1387; Shoreline Dev.. Inc. v. Utah County.
835 P.2d 207, 211 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). Fell further states that:
The true test to be applied as to whether interest should be allowed before
judgment in a given case or not is, therefore, not whether the damages are
unliquidated or otherwise, but whether the injury and consequent damages are
complete and must be ascertained as of a particular time and in accordance
with fixed rules of evidence and known standards of value, which the court or
jury must follow in fixing the amount, rather than be guided by their best
judgment in assessing the amount to be allowed for past as well as for future
injury, or for elements that cannot be measured by any fixed standards of
value.
Fell. 88 P. at 1007 (emphasis added); Orlob v. Wasatch Medical Mgmt. 2005 UT App 430,
Tf 35, 124 P.3d 269. The Utah Supreme Court has stated that just because a claim can be
reduced to a monetary figure does meet the test. Canyon. 781 P.2d at 422. In Canyon, an
insurer brought a claim for lost profits of a new business. The Court then held that lost profit
damages are analogous to wrongful death or defamation cases because they are uncertain
until determined by the trial court or jury and are, therefore, unliquidated. In such cases,
prejudgment interest is not appropriate. Id.
In this case, the trial court ignored the nature of the damage claim, the amount of
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which was subject to the best judgment of the jury. R. 8583, p. 54,1. 20-25, p. 55,1. 1-4.
Believing it was using the Fell standard and Utah Code Ann., Section 15-1-1(2) (2002), the
court awarded prejudgment interest of $199,317 from December 1, 2007 through February
13, 2007. R. 8559, 8561. Focusing solely on the first part of the Fell test, the court stated:
it seems to me there is no other - there is no evidence that there was any
damage that they could have relied on after that November 6 date of 2002. So
I'm going to award prejudgment interest from November 6. I'm going to
actually make it December 1 because I think a reasonable time thereafter to
calculate things and issue the check would have been approximately three
weeks to do that. That would seem a reasonable time. So December 1, 2002
would be the date that I would commence the calculation of prejudgment
interest.
However, the court simply ignored the second part of the Fell test that requires that
damages be ascertainable in accordance with fixed rules of evidence and known standards
of value rather than be guided by the jury's best judgment. Fell 88 P. at 1007.
A good example is found in Cornia v. Wilcox. In that case, a cattle owner sued a
caretaker for loss of cattle while under his care. The Supreme Court upheld the denial of
prejudgment interest explaining:
In this case, the jury heard conflicting testimony from experts regarding
the cattle's expected pregnancy rates, weight range, loss rates, and market
prices. In addition, the jury heard divergent evidence regarding the calves'
expected gender, weight range, mortality rates, and market prices. Plaintiffs
could not establish these elements as a matter of fact, and thus the jury was
free to use its best judgment in ascertaining and assessing damages.
Plaintiffs' expert did estimate the value of the missing cows in his
damage calculation. However, "[w]hile the expert's estimates were a reliable
enough basis for awarding damages, the assumptions used to arrive at those
estimates are by no means the only way to arrive at [the] damages." Without
any clear factual information, plaintiffs' damages could not be measured by
"facts and figures" or "calculated with mathematical accuracy." Under these
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circumstances, the trial court correctly denied plaintiffs prejudgment interest.
Id. at 1387 (internal citations omitted)(emphasis added). See also Jonsson v. Bromley, 2001
UT App 149, 2001 WL 495915, *1 (reversing award of prejudgment interest where trial
court determined damages based upon its best assessment) (attached as A.B-1).
In this case, 3rd East asserted the equitable claim of breach of fiduciary duty. 3rd East
alleged that it was entitled to repayment of its capital contribution and lost profits. The jury
was charged with determining what damages 3rd East would have received but for Watts'
conduct. To make a damage determination, the jury needed to consider and 3rd East should
have presented evidence to determine profits such as unnecessary costs incurred, costs of
construction for lower priced units, a time analysis defining when construction could have
been completed, evidence of market prices of lower priced units, average times on the market
for lower priced units, and the availability of buyers - issues that cannot be calculated with
mathematical certainty, and are left to the best judgment of the jury. See Issue Nos. 4 and
5 (3rd East failed to do so).
Even Teuscher (3rd East's financial expert) presented a financial calculation based on
the actual costs incurred and then simply suggested that the jury use their judgment to
determine (a) what construction costs were necessary or unapproved, (b) whether or not
interest costs should have been incurred and if so, how much, (c) how much should have
been spent on marketing, and (d) whether other "unsupported" costs were appropriate or not
and if so, how much. R. 8587, p. 589,1. 15-25, p. 590,1. 1-24; A.D-7.
The Special Verdict Form provides no guidance how the jury applied its best
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judgment to come up with the damage award.23 The damages, if any were proven at all, were
left to the best judgment of the jury; therefore, prejudgment interest is inappropriate.
ISSUE NO. 6: Did the trial court err in awarding 3rd East attorney fees of $226,400.00
against a total claim of $269,520.00 when 3rd East's attorney's affidavit failed to adequately
allocate attorney fees between its one successful claim for which attorney fees were awarded
and all other claims successful or unsuccessful?
The trial court committed reversible error by awarding attorney fees based upon an
inadequate affidavit under Utah law. An award of attorney fees based upon an affidavit that
does not satisfy the criteria established in Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 990
(Utah 1988) is reversible error. Foote v. Clark. 962 P.2d 52, 55 (Utah 1998) (holding that
the burden of proof is on the party claiming fees and reversing an award of attorney fees for
inadequate affidavit). Dixie State Bank, 764 P.2d at 990-91, established four main criteria
that an affidavit must satisfy before an attorney fees award may be granted, namely (1) what
legal work was performed; (2) how much of the work performed was reasonably necessary;
(3) is the attorney's billing rate consistent with local rates for similar circumstances; and (4)
are there circumstances which require consideration of additional factors? Id A trial court
has discretion in awarding fees, however, the exercise of its discretion must be based upon
an evaluation of the evidence. Cottonwood Mall Corp. v. Sine, 830 P.2d 266, 269 (Utah
1992) ("When the evidence presented is insufficient, the court's evaluation of those fees will
also be insufficient."). Foote, 962 P.2d at 55, added that claims must also be categorized

23

The trial court acknowledged as much when it stated: "[T]he problem is we
don't have any ruling by the jury that they included [the one percent] calculation in their
judgment against Mr. Watts as part of that $474,000.00." R. 8538, p. 54,1. 17-20.
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according to various opposing parties.
Watts challenges the factual findings of the trial court. 3rd East's counsel presented
an Affidavit (the "Affidavit") in its attempt to satisfy its burden regarding it's claim for
attorney fees at $200 per hour. See Affidavits of Thor B. Roundy as to Costs, Expenses and
Attorney Fees (A.C-7, 8). The evidence provided by 3rd East is marshaled as follows:
1. Counsel spent 1,347.6 hrs of time in prosecution of the action (A.C-8). R.
8488, R. 8270 (1,308.4 hours) (A.C-7).
2. Counsel stated the time spent was reasonable and necessary. A.C-8, R.
8488.
3. Counsel provided a "spreadsheet" of the work. R. 8488-89, 8497-8516.
4. Counsel provided the following conclusions as to allotment of time:
a.
communicating with client =115 hours;
b.
communicating with opposing counsel = 95.9 hours;
c.
discovery = 121.1 hours;
d.
legal research = 39.5 hours;
e.
pleading and successful pretrial motions = 348.7 hours;
f.
unsuccessful pretrial motions =102.1 hours;
(i)
plaintiffs motion regarding prejudgment interest;
(ii)
motions for summary judgment or in limine which
resulted in dismissal of various claims by plaintiff;
(iii) a motion regarding a lis pendens filed by plaintiff;
(iv) motions regarding the injury allegedly sustained by Mr.
Watts which resulted in a continuation of the trial.
g.
trial preparation and presentation = 487.3 hours;
h.
post-trial motions = 38 hours;
i.
no allocation of time for claims against Todd was made to a
separate category although it was fewer than 10 hours.24
The court entered the following Findings of Fact, in relevant part, as follows:
1.
Plaintiffs counsel spent 1,347.6 hours in the prosecution of this
action from January 10, 2001 through June 30, 2007, as set forth in the
Affidavit of Thor B. Roundy. R. 8560.
2.
The work performed by plaintiffs counsel was extremely
R. 8489.
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detailed, complicated and laborious, and properly reflected the nature of the
case. Id.
3.
The work was reasonable and necessary in terms of the ultimate
outcome of the case. IcL
4.
The evidence and the issues were complex. Id
5.
Plaintiff prevailed substantially in the case, the claims upon
which plaintiff prevailed at trial reflected a successful strategy despite the fact
that some overlapping theories of damages were dismissed or dropped. Id.
6.
For the most part, all of plaintiff s claims had some merit and
related to [sic] damages amount awarded by the jury at trial. Id,
7.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the issue of the lis pendens that
was addressed prior to trial, the time spent in mediation or settlement
discussion [sic], and some of the time which proved unsuccessful in pretrial
motions is not appropriately included in the Court's determination of an
appropriate attorneys fee award. Id.
8.
Likewise, the Court does not consider the contingency fee
arrangement between the plaintiff and its counsel to be the guiding factor in
determining the value of the work performed. R. 8560-61.
9.
Based upon the foregoing findings concerning the relevant
factors in this case, the amount of attorney fees that were reasonably incurred
and awardable against Russell K. Watts in this action is $226,400. R. 8561.
3rd East's Affidavit and the court's findings are deficient. This action was commenced
by 3rd East, Ted Stevensen, and Barbara Stevensen, as Plaintiffs against Watts, RKW, The
Club and Bryan Todd ("Todd") as Defendants. Plaintiffs asserted eight causes of action;
however contained within the eight causes of action were discrete claims against the
Defendants including eleven claims for declaratory relief. 3rd East alleged seventeen claims
against The Club, seven claims against RKW, twelve claims against Watts and eight claims
against Todd. Ted and Barbara Stevensen alleged seven claims against RKW, thirteen claims
against The Club, twelve claims against Watts and eight claims against Todd. See A.C-1.
The claims against Todd were settled prior to trial. R. 1803-1806. All claims asserted by
the Stevensens were dismissed prior to trial. R. 4018 at 4032-4035 (A.C-2).
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At trial, 3rd East proceeded with two claims against Watts, negligent misrepresentation
and breach of fiduciary duty, but only the latter was submitted to the jury for which the trial
court determined fees were payable. A.C-5. 3rd East did not submit to the jury any of its
claims against RKW. Id. By summary judgment prior to trial, 3rd East successfully litigated
one claim against The Club for the 1% commission payments under the March Agreement,
which does not contain a provision for attorney fees. Ex. 7. See A.C-2 at 4023. 3rd East
submitted only two claims against The Club to the jury, but only one was successful (claim
for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing under a contract with no attorney fee
provision). See A.C-5. Attorneys fees are awarded only if provided by contract or statute.
Collier v. Heinz. 827 P.2d 982, 983 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). See A.D-1 (no provision for
attorney fees); Utah Limited Liability Company Acts, Utah Code Ann. § § 48-2b-101,48-2c101 et seq.) (no provision for attorney fees). No claims for declaratory relief were granted.
A.C-1; A.C-5; A.C-9.
The Affidavit fails as a matter of law as follows: (a) it fails to delineate work between
unsuccessful claims against Watts and successful claims against Watts; (b) it fails to
delineate work performed on behalf of 3rd East between successful claims against Watts for
which fees were awarded and successful claims against The Club for which no fees are
payable, (c) it fails to delineate work between 3rd East and dismissed Plaintiffs Ted and
Barbara Stevensen; (d) it fails to delineate work on behalf of Plaintiffs Ted and Barbara
Stevensen against RKW and Watts that were dismissed; and (e) it fails to delineate work on
behalf of Plaintiffs 3rd East, Ted Stevensen and Barbara Stevensen against Todd which
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claims were settled (although the Affidavit states it was less than 10 hours, it doesn't identify
any entries which support that conclusion). While the court believed that the total claim for
fees was not justified and somehow reduced 3rd East's claim by $43,120 (215.6 hours of time
at $200 per hour - while 3rd East asserted that the reduction should only be 102.1 hours),
there is no way to discern from the Affidavit or the trial court's findings, how that reduction
was arrived at or, more importantly, if further reductions should have been made.
Specifically with respect to the Affidavit, there is no way to determine if the categories of
work designated therein, namely, "communications with client," "communications with
opposing counsel," "discovery," "legal research," and "pleadings" related to unsuccessful
plaintiffs, unsuccessful claims or even successful claims for which attorney fees are not
recoverable. There is no way to determine from Counsel's allocation of fees to "pleadings
and successful pretrial motions" what time was allocated to successful motions for which
attorney fees are recoverable and to successful motions for which fees are not recoverable.
Likewise there is no way to identify in the spreadsheet any of the asserted 102.1 hours of
time for unsuccessful pretrial motions or the 215.6 hours the court deducted. An award
notwithstanding these failings in the evidence resulted in exactly the type of attorney fee
award that imposes a burden on one target defendant contrary to Utah law. Turtle Mgmt.,
Inc. v. Haggis Mgmt. Inc.. 645 P.2d 667, 671 (Utah 1982); Dixie State Bank. 764 P.2d at
990.
The court was left to guess what the reasonable fee award should be. As in Foote, this
is insufficient to justify an award of attorney's fees and the award must be reversed.
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ISSUE NO. 7. Did the trial court err by awarding 3rd East expert witness fees, copy costs and
other expenses of litigation that were not taxable costs or provided for by contract or law?
The trial court's award of costs is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.
Young v. State, 2000 UT 91, 16 P.3d 549. 3rd East is only entitled to certain types of costs
under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, as interpreted by case law. Utah Rule of Civil
Procedure 54(d) provides for costs to be awarded to a prevailing party, but does not define
"costs." However, Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 771,774 (Utah 1980), the leading case on
costs, defines costs as "those fees which are required to be paid to the court and to witnesses,
and for which the statutes authorize to be included in the judgment." Thus, the following
costs awarded to the Plaintiff are not permitted.
A.

Expert Witness Fees. 3rd East is not entitled to an award of expert witness fees

of $36,710.00 for three experts. The Frampton Court held that witness fees above the
statutory amount are not costs contemplated by Rule 54(d). Frampton, 605 P.2d at 773-74.
The Young court stated: "Fees paid to witnesses above the statutory allowance, as well as
amounts paid for trial exhibits, as a matter of law, are not recoverable 'costs' of litigation,
but are merely expenses of litigation." Young, 2000 UT 19, f 23. Only the statutory witness
fee may be taxed as costs against the losing party. Armed Forces Ins. Exch. v. Harrison,
2003 UT 14, Tf 43, 70 P.3d 35, 46. See Utah Code Ann. §78-46-28 (2002). Similarly, the
Frampton Court stated: "expert witnesses cannot be awarded extra compensation unless the
statute expressly so provides." Id. at 774. See also John Call Engineering, Inc. v. Manti City
Corporation, 795 P.2d 678 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (upholding denial of expert witness fees in
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excess of statutory amount); Morgan v. Morgan. 795 P.2d 684, 686-87 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)
(witness compensation in excess of statutory schedule is generally inappropriate as costs).
The trial court stated in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law that expert fees
"were reasonable and necessary to the prosecution of this action given the nature and
complexity of the evidence presented to the jury." A.C-9 at 8560. "Plaintiff is entitled to .
. . expenses of litigation as consequential damages against Russell K. Watts under the
specific facts of this case...." Id. at R. 8561. If evidence of complexity were the defining
factor of an award of expert witness fees, arguably such fees would be awarded in every case
in which an expert is used, since experts always address complex evidentiary issues.
3rd East argued that it was entitled to expert witness fees as consequential damages
(i.e., foreseeable litigation expenses). R. 8242; R. 8583, p. 79. To support this theory, it
relied on several breach-of-contract cases. R. 8240-42. Those cases are irrelevant in this
case since there is no contract between the parties. Nevertheless, 3rd East argued that since
Watts was Manager of The Club, the cases involving employment contracts (i.e., Heslop v.
Bank of Utah. 839 P.2d 828 (Utah 1992)) would be applicable. However, this Court has
stated that although the Utah Supreme Court allows attorney fees as consequential damages
in "limited" breach-of-contract contexts, "[t]his exception is inapplicable [where] there
is no contract between the [parties]." Lewiston State Bank v. Greenline Equipment,
L.L.C., 2006 UT App 446, If 21, 147 P.3d 951. Like attorneys fees, expert witness fees
should not be allowed where, as here, there is no contract between the parties.
This Court further explained that "[w]here a breach of contract has not occurred, the
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supreme court has allowed consequential damages only when the natural consequence of
one's negligence is another's involvement in a dispute with a third party." Lewiston, 2006
UT App at Tf22. This third-party tort rule "only applies to the recovery of fees incurred in
resolving third-party disputes caused by a defendant's negligence. It does not apply to fees
incurred in recovering damages from that defendant." Id. Since 3rd East sought consequential
damages from Watts for breach of fiduciary duty and not for a third-party or contract claim,
expert witness fees should not have been awarded to 3rd East as consequential damages.
Since the award exceeds the statutory allowance, the award must be reversed.
B.

Copy Costs. The trial court abused its discretion by awarding $8,724.08 in

photocopy costs to 3rd East. 3rd East did not provide billings to enable the court to determine
the basis of the copy costs. Frampton and its progeny make clear that trial-exhibit costs are
not a permitted cost under Rule 54(d). Frampton. 605 P.2d 774; Young. 2000 UT 91 at ffif
20-22 (reversing trial court's award for trial-exhibit costs). Copy costs are also not a cost
contemplated by Rule 54(d). Chase v. Scott. 2001 UT App 404, ffif 18-20, 38 P.3d 1001,
upheld the trial court's award of copy costs based purely upon the parties' contract, for, as
it reiterated, such costs are outside the scope of Rule 54(d). Id Because the trial court
awarded 3rd East such costs, it abused its discretion, and its award must be reversed.
3.

Service of Process. The trial court abused its discretion by awarding $329.50

in service-of-process fees to 3rd East.

Such fees are not identified by Frampton as

recoverable, as they are not "fees which are required to be paid to the court and to witnesses
[or] for which the statutes authorize ...." Frampton. 605 P.2d at 774. Lloyds Unlimited v.
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Nature's Way Marketing, Ltd., 753 P.2d 507, 512 (1988), citing Frampton, stated that the
costs of service of subpoenas, even while necessary, are not properly taxable. Because such
costs are not awardable, the award must be reversed. Had these costs been awardable, 3rd
East still failed to substantiate them by affidavit. Why are they so high? The cost of service
of process on the other defendants (i.e., The Club, RKW, and Todd) is not taxable to Watts,
and there should be no costs attributable to subpoenaing Watts to testify (he was a party).
4.

Deposition Costs.

The trial court abused its discretion by awarding $2,187.20

in deposition costs to 3rd East ($280.40 for Ted Stevensen's deposition, $290.05 for Bryan
Todd's, and $1,616.75 for Watts'). R. 8240. "The party claiming entitlement to the costs of
depositions has the burden of demonstrating that the depositions were reasonably necessary
and whether that burden is met within the sound discretion of the trial court." Lloyd's, 753
P.2d at 512. In Lloyds, this Court upheld the trial court's denial of deposition costs on the
basis that the plaintiff did not use the opposing party's deposition at trial. Id. Here, 3rd East
used Watts' deposition once or twice at trial (only selected portions taken out of context) and
never used Bryan Todd's or Stevensen's deposition.

Since Stevensen was 3rd East's

representative, his deposition was not reasonably necessary. The negligible use of Watts'
and the non-use of Todd's and Stevensen's depositions do not rise to the level of "reasonably
necessary". Because Appellee failed in its burden, the award must be reversed.
CONCLUSION
The trial court below committed several errors of law prejudicial to Watts (i.e.,
imposing an erroneous standard on the manager of a limited liability company; permitting
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the jury to reach a speculative award for lost profits; permitting the prejudicial introduction,
without a foundation of relevance or reliance and notwithstanding Watts' motion in limine,
of banking-industry-standard testimony; permitting the prejudicial introduction of
construction-industry-standard testimony for arms-length transactions despite such evidence
being irrelevant and contrary to the parties' agreement). Because of the degree to which such
errors pervade the jury verdict below, the verdict cannot stand and must be reversed.
There is also a complete evidentiary failure to prove the high standard of gross
negligence/willful misconduct of the manager of the company (i.e., lack of even slight care).
In fact, the evidence clearly shows that the manager followed a rationale and legitimate
course of conduct based upon experience and reliance on experts, which but for a
superseding real estate slump, was the most propitious course of action for all parties
involved, including creditors. The evidence even shows that The Club outsold competing
condominium projects during the period. The business judgment rule was fashioned to
protect such thoughtful and well-advised actions of managers, and, as long as the business
judgment has a rationale basis, its protection is not diminished simply because an unintended
injury occurs to a member of the company — a risk assumed from the outset. Since the
evidence cannot support the verdict, the verdict cannot stand and must be reversed.
Even if Watts were to have failed to exercise even slight care, there is a complete
failure to prove proximate cause and damages beyond mere speculation. 3rd East's experts
could not identify any unnecessary costs, damages calculable through objective data or facts,
or even that units could have sold faster — the central them of their testimony being I don't
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know. Speculation cannot support a finding of proximate cause and damages. Therefore, the
verdict cannot stand and must be reversed.
Because damages were left to the best judgment of the jury and couldn't be calculated
with mathematical certainty, prejudgment interest on its damages award is prohibited by Utah
law. Also, 3rd East's counsel's affidavit for costs and attorneys fees was deficient by law for
an appropriate attorney fees award. Witness fees are not a cost within Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure Rule 54(d), and an award therefor cannot exceed the statutory limit. Finally, 3rd
East did not distinguish, substantiate, or show the necessity of its copy, service-of-process,
or deposition costs. Collectively, the court made Mr. Watts a target defendant, with
unjustified and/or excessive prejudgment interest, attorneys fees, costs, and witness fees well
beyond the statutory limit. Consequently, Watts implores this Court to reverse the orders of
the trial court.
In the event the Verdict is overturned, Mr. Watts is entitled to indemnification from
the members of The Club for costs and attorney fees and requests that the Court instruct the
lower court to that effect. See Utah Code Ann. § 48-2b-155 (1996).
Dated this 2nd day of September, 2008. ^ ^ \
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DENNIS K. POOLE
POOLE & ASSOCIATES, L.C.
Attorneys for AppellantRussellK. Watts
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